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Abstract  
In  response  to  the  growing  tension  between  civil  liberties  and  civil  rights,  this  research  
investigates  the  relationship  between  the  relative  expansiveness  of  free  speech  and  a  the  
nationwide  propensity  for  hate  crimes.  I  argue  that  government’s  legal  limitations  of  speech  
influence  the  development  of  linguistic  and  hierarchical  norms  in  a  national  culture.  Given  
structural  inequality’s  association  to  violence  and  crimes  of  intimidation,  I  hypothesize  that  as  
the  government  expands  the  legal  bounds  of  free  speech,  the  national  propensity  for  hate  crimes  
decreases.  Text  analyses  of  50  influential  freedom  of  expression  rulings  in  the  United  States  
(U.S.)  Supreme  Court  from  1919-2019  demonstrate  the  United  States’  increased  tendency  over  
the  past  century  to  rule  with  an  increasingly  expansive  interpretation  of  freedom  of  expression.  A  
conglomeration  of  secondary  source  data  of  prejudice-motivated  victimizations  in  the  U.S.  over  
the  same  century  creates  an  image  of  a  rising  annual  hate  crime  victimization.  This  data  and  
other  findings  within  the  research  suggest  that  the  national  attention  to  hate  crimes  and  tendency  
to  record  these  incidents  was  deeply  intertwined  with  cultural  development  in  the  U.S.,  
specifically  as  it  relates  to  social  movements  and  attitudes  towards  diversity.  
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“Speech  is  powerful.  It  can  stir  people  to  action,  move  them  to  tears  of  both  joy  and  
sorrow,  and…inflict  great  pain.  [W]e  cannot  react  to  that  pain  by  punishing  the  speaker.  As  a  
Nation  we  have  chosen  a  different  course—to  protect  even  hurtful  speech  on  public  issues  to  
ensure  that  we  do  not  stifle  public  debate.”  --Supreme  Court  Justice  John  Roberts,  2011  
  
Introduction  
Americans  frequently  assume  free  speech  is  the  best  solution  to  balancing  the  harm  of  
hate  with  the  desire  for  liberty.  The  classic  American  argument  is  that  the  best  solution  for  hate  is  
open  discussion  in  a  “marketplace  of  ideas;”  that  in  order  to  permit  the  speech  we  love,  we  must  
also  permit  the  speech  we  hate.  Yet,  others  argue,  “racial  insults  and  remarks  are  among  the  most  
pervasive  means  by  which  discriminatory  attitudes  are  imparted,  communicating  the  message  
that  distinctions  of  race  are  ones  of  merit,  dignity,  status,  and  personhood”  (Delgado  &  Stefancic,  
2018,  pp.  7-8).  Thus,  the  debate  between  free  speech  absolutists  and  supporters  of  hate-speech  
laws,  such  as  the  policies  several  Western  European  countries  have  implemented,  persists  today.  
This  project  asks,  how  has  the  evolving  definition  of  free  speech  influenced  the  
propensity  for  hate  crimes  in  the  United  States?  I  argue  that  as  the  definition  of  free  speech  
became  liberalized  to  allow  for  a  wider  array  of  ideas,  the  national  severity  and  frequency  of  hate  
crimes  declined.  “Free  speech”  refers  to  the  enacted  reality  of  the  First  Amendment’s  Free  
Speech  clause  that  states,  “Congress  shall  make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech”  (U.S.  
Const.  Amend.  I).  In  this  research,  I  employ  a  functioning  definition  for  “hate  crimes”  adapted  
from  multiple  sources,  including  definitions  from  multiple  government  and  non-government  
agencies.  For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  I  built  upon  existing  sources  to  define  hate  crimes  as  
‘convicted  or  non-convicted  crime  committed  within  one’s  non-governmental,  individual  
capacity,  which  was  motivated  by  the  actor’s  prejudice  against  the  victim’s  race,  religion,  
disability,  sexual  orientation,  ethnicity,  gender,  or  gender  identity’  (American  Civil  Liberties  
Union,  2021;  Anti-Defamation  League,  2019;  Department  of  Justice,  2021;  Federal  Bureau  of  
Investigation,  2021;  Southern  Poverty  Law  Center,  2021;).   Further,  in  this  study  hate  crimes  are  
recorded  by  the  number  of  victims,  and  a  crime  is  recorded  as  “motivated  by  prejudice,”  at  the  
word  of  police  records,  victim  testimony,  and  historical  documentation.  
I  argue  free  speech  has  become  liberalized  to  allow  for  more  speech,  regardless  of  the  
chilled  usage  of  overtly  racist  speech  from  the  pre-civil  rights  era  because  Supreme  Court  rulings  
expanded  the  breadth  of  ideas  outside  the  dominant  culture  legally  permitted  to  be  expressed.  
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This  expansion  occurred  alongside  cultural  development,  by  which  the  dominant  culture  
legitimized  changing  ideas  and  lifestyles,  producing  a  more  hospitable  environment  for  some  
minorities.  While  open  speech  may  allow  for  the  legitimization  of  extremist  prejudice  within  
factions,  the  culture  of  the  majority  tends  to  neutralize  overt  and  normalized  prejudice  overtime  –  
resulting  in  an  environment  that  may  still  be  harmful  to  some  communities.   
From  a  policy  perspective,  this  is  increasingly  important.  Rights  for  various  historically  
oppressed  minority  groups  have  gradually  become  explicitly  included  within  mainstream  
ideology  rather  than  outcasted  ideas.  In  order  to  change  prejudice  views,  it  is  necessary  that  those  
views  be  challenged  in  discussion  rather  than  silenced,  maintained,  and  martyred  by  their  holders  
(Strossen,  2018).  The  threat  of  prejudiced  violence  is  greatly  prevalent  today,  and  in  the  attempt  
to  mitigate  the  harms  engendered  by  socially  validated  hate  speech,  it  is  important  to  recognize  
the  hyper  polarizing  effects  of  technology  leading  the  hate  fueled  violence  we  see  today.  
In  what  follows,  I  first  review  the  relevant  literature  comparing  the  perspectives  favoring  
and  opposing  hate  speech  restriction,  present  my  theoretical  framework  for  the  relationship  
between  hate  crimes  and  free  speech  in  a  diversifying  society,  and  highlight  my  hypothesis  for  
testing.  Then,  I  outline  my  methodology  and  present  the  results  of  my  research.  Finally,  I  discuss  
the  important  implications  of  this  research  and  conclude  with  an  exploration  of  potential  avenues  
for  future  research.  If  the  global  community  can  better  understand  the  role  speech  laws  play  in  
creating  a  national  tendency  towards  tolerance,  it  may  prevent  harm  to  the  minority  from  tyranny  
of  the  majority.   
  
Literature  Review  
Pro-Hate  Speech  Restriction  
Scholars  in  favor  of  hate-speech  laws  pose  arguments  which  are  less  familiar  to  
Americans  than  the  justifications  for  free  speech  absolutism.  The  foundation  of  these  arguments  
for  hate  speech  laws  is  the  premise  that  persistent  racist  speech  creates  structural  disparities  and  
discrimination  (Calvart,  1997).  Hate  speech  and  stigmatizing  expressions  are  capable  of  
inflicting  psychological  pressures  on  the  group  and  societal  level,  and  individuals  who  live  in  
minority  stress  are  likely  to  incur  physical  health  problems  after  experiencing  a  major  
prejudice-related  event  (Frost,  Lehavot,  &  Meyer,  2015;  Quinn,  2017).  The  harm  of  such  
expression  seriously  outweighs  the  harm  of  suppressing  it  (Massaro,  1991);  while  derogatory  
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speech  itself  may  not  create  imminent  externally  expressed  harm,  it  creates  an  environment  
where  the  vocal  degradation  and  prejudice  are  perpetuated  (Stengel,  2019).  Hate  speech  is  
responsible  for  creating  and  sustaining  identity-based  hierarchy  by  assaulting  the  dignity  of  its  
targets  (Waldron,  2012;  Heyman,  2008).  Others  argue  that  hate  speech  attacks  self-respect  
specifically,  which  diminishes  agency  and  entitlement  to  free  speech  (Seglow,  2016).  In  light  of  
the  harms  caused  by  hate  speech,  arguments  favoring  free  speech  are  arguably  a  paternalistic  
way  the  majority  maintains  power  over  the  minority  by  asserting  they  know  better  than  the  
victims  of  hate  speech.  While  moving  through  society  ignorant  of  the  differential  terrains  created  
by  subliminal  social  hierarchy,  the  majority  purports  that  targeted  minorities  should  just  toughen  
up  and  educate  the  racists  themselves.  However,  the  debate  on  who  is  responsible  for  mitigating  
hate  speech  debate  needs  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of  a  power  dynamic  (Delgado  &  
Stephanic,  2018).  In  short,  proponents  of  hate  speech  regulation  argue  generating  equality  is  
necessary  to  guarantee  universal  access  to  the  First  Amendment;  that  the  First  Amendment  
should  not  be  prioritized  above  the  13th  (Waldron,  2012;  Heyman,  2008;  Delgado  &  Stephanic,  
2018).  
Another  line  of  argument  asserts  that  tolerating  the  intolerant  will  empower  the  very  
ideas  which  seek  to  undo  the  principals  of  tolerance  and  liberty  (Marcuse,  1965).  There  is  
insufficient  evidence  to  confirm  the  notion  that  good  ideas  eradicate  bad  ones.  Rather  in  today’s  
society,  the  First  Amendment  is  an  outdated  system  when  essentially  everyone  has  a  megaphone  
online,  often  permitting  the  most  bigoted  ideas  to  make  waves.  Further,  huge  accumulations  of  
money  drown  out  anti-establishment  ideas  by  creating  cohesive  ideologies  for  the  purpose  of  
predisposing  the  public  to  favor  ideas  upholding  the  current  power  hierarchy  (Delgado  &  
Stephanic,  2018;  Marcuse,  1965;  Stengel,  2019).   
  
Pro-Free  Speech  
The  more  familiar  arguments  in  favor  of  free  speech  have  been  in  circulation  before  the  
independence  of  the  United  States.  These  initial  arguments  were  not  positioned  against  the  
egalitarian  viewpoints  of  their  current  opposition.  Rather,  they  responded  to  totalitarian  
ideologies  which  positioned  government  as  the  force  by  which  a  state’s  leader-maintained  
dominance  via  a  multitude  of  methods,  including  punishing  treasonous  and  unfavorable  speech.  
Contrasting  this  totalitarian  status  quo,  Baruch  Spinoza  positioned  free  speech  as  essential  to  a  
  
6  
stable  government.  Prohibiting  speech  allows  people  to  make  martyrs  of  themselves  for  their  
suppressed  ideas  and  by  effect,  strengthens  the  case  for  their  suppressed  idea.  If  a  government  
declares  an  idea  so  dangerous  it  cannot  be  spoken,  curiosity  and  intrigue  strengthen  the  idea’s  
circulation  and  justification.  The  overt  suppression  of  a  particular  idea  destabilizes  a  government  
regardless  if  that  government  otherwise  ensures  liberty  for  its  civilians  (1670).  Along  this  line  of  
thought,  John  Stuart  Mill  argued  that  the  point  of  government  is  liberty,  with  the  purpose  of  
generating  a  better  life  for  its  civilians.  Mill  was  skeptical  of  both  government  tyranny  and  of  
what  he  called  tyranny  of  the  majority,  the  tendency  for  the  majority  to  castigate  minorities’  
ideas  and  ways  of  life:  
  
“Protection,  therefore,  against  the  tyranny  of  the  magistrate  is  not  enough:  there  needs  protection  
also  against  the  tyranny  of  the  prevailing  opinion  and  feeling;  against  the  tendency  of  society  to  
impose,  by  other  means  than  civil  penalties,  its  own  ideas  and  practices  as  rules  of  conduct  on  
those  who  dissent  from  them;  to  fetter  the  development,  and,  if  possible,  prevent  the  formation,  of  
any  individuality  not  in  harmony  with  its  ways,  and  compel  all  characters  to  fashion  themselves  
upon  the  model  of  its  own.”  
- On  Liberty ,  1859  
  
Many  current  scholars  argue  free  speech  guarantees  minorities  access  to  redress  their  
grievances  and  strive  for  equal  rights  (American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  2020;  Strossen,  2018).  If  
minorities  have  an  issue  with  something  going  on  in  society,  the  solution  is  not  to  attempt  to  ban  
particular  sectors  of  speech,  but  rather  to  encourage  open  dialogue  and  counter-speech  (Strossen,  
2018,  p.  34;  Milton,  1644;  Lepoutre,  2017).  In  addition  to  potential  government  instability  
generated  by  restricting  speech,  censorship  would  plainly  be  ineffective  (Spinoza,  1670).  Some  
scholarship  even  claims  there  is  not  substantial  evidence  to  claim  that  hate  speech  is  responsible  
for  sustaining  identity-based  social  hierarchies  (Simpson,  2012).  Finally,  Goldberg  assumes  on  
the  face  that  free  speech  should  be  kept  as  expansive  as  possible,  and  limitations  to  such  speech  
to  account  for  the  harms  it  produces  should  not  be  implemented  if  there  is  any  less  than  direct  
harm  similar  to  that  which  could  have  been  caused  by  conduct  (2016).  
This  review  of  the  literature  outlined  the  major  arguments  within  the  current  academic  
dialogue  about  the  effects  of  speech  laws.  Yet,  one  key  limitation  with  the  literature  to  date  is  it  is  
largely  theoretical  in  nature,  lacking  a  wide  scale  analysis  of  the  observable  effects  of  restricting  
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or  permitting  speech.  I  aim  to  contribute  to  this  literature  by  producing  a  historically-based  
analysis  of  the  relationship  between  expanding  free  speech  and  its  effects  on  hate  crime  rates  in  
the  United  States.  
  
Theory   
Evolving  Norms  Surrounding  Speech  
To  address  this  puzzle,  I  present  a  new  theoretical  framework.  Specifically,  I  argue  that  in  
a  diversifying  society,  allowing  a  wider  breadth  of  speech  over  time  is  more  likely  to  decrease  
the  state’s  propensity  for  hate  crimes.  I  begin  with  the  assumption  that  the  country  has  a  baseline  
level  of  social,  political,  and  economic  inequality,  and  has  patterns  of  both  immigration  and  
diversification.  Independent  of  time  and  place,  waves  of  high  immigration  are  regularly  met  with  
waves  of  anti-immigrant  sentiment  unless  the  locality’s  population  already  has  an  immigrant-rich  
population  (Kauffman,  2014;  History,  2020;  McLaren,  Neundorf  &  Paterson,  2020).   
In  a  white-dominated  society,  whites  who  do  not  necessarily  dislike  racial/ethnic  
outgroups  but  still  feel  a  sense  of  white  racial  solidarity  tend  to  be  motivated  to  “preserve  
whiteness”  in  an  attempt  to  maintain  their  superior  status  in  the  country’s  racial  hierarchy  
(Jardina,  2019).  White-dominated  societies  experiencing  anti-immigrant  contempt,  during  an  
influx  if  immigration,  are  likely  to  voice  that  contempt  among  one  another.  Communication  is  
reflective  of  the  worldviews  in  society.  Thus,  majority  member’s  contempt  for  minorities  
provokes  a  public  anti-immigration  dialogue  that  is  likely  to  evolve  into  an  ideology  which  
functionally  suppresses  the  expanse  of  minorities’  social  and  political  rights.  Similarly,  
communication  influences  worldviews.  As  derogatory  language  is  normalized,  the  population  
becomes  desensitized  to  the  offensiveness  of  the  speech,  and  societies  become  more  accepting  of  
hate  speech  than  minorities  (Soral  &  Bilewicz,  2020).  The  language  in  society  then  casually  and  
systematically  oppresses  minority  groups  and  groups  not  in  power,  resulting  in  the  use  of  
derogatory  language  to  legitimized  discrimination  and  group  hierarchies  (Cervone  et.  al.,  2021).   
It  is  possible  for  minority  groups  to  generate  contempt  for  the  oppressively  domineering  
group.  With  a  wider  permission  for  speech,  ideas  outside  of  the  dominate  ideology  are  
communicated.  Though  the  view  of  communication  as  an  agent  of  change ,  more  expansive  
speech  enables  minority  group  members  to  find  identification  and  support  amongst  one  another  
and  linguistically  narrate  their  contempt  for  the  majority’s  oppressive  tendencies,  similar  to  (but  
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functionally  divergent  from)  the  domineering  group’s  normalization  of  derogatory  language  
about  minority  groups.  As  the  contemptuous  dialogue  contempt  spreads  throughout  minority  
populations,  their  potential  to  network  and  organize  in  opposition  among  one  another  expands.   
Majority  members  who  feel  guilty  for  systematic  oppression  are  likely  to  become  more  
supportive  of  the  petition  for  minority  protection  policies  (Swim  &  Miller,  1999).  Other  majority  
members  may  feel  anger  towards  in-group  advantage,  which  motivates  majority  members  to  
political  action  supportive  of  the  minorities  (Leach,  Iyer  &  Pedersen,  2006).  As  a  result  of  these  
functions,  and  political  pressure,  some  majority  members  in  positions  of  institutional  power  may  
heed  to  the  petitioners  demands  for  legal  equality  and  protection  for  minorities.  Systematic  
changes  then  begin  to  take  place--bettering  the  social,  political,  and  economic  position  of  the  
minority  group.  This  does  not  mean  absolute  equality  will  be  able  to  take  place,  but  it  does  mean  
there  is  a  potential  for  things  to  improve.  This  is  especially  likely  if  legal  protections  result  in  a  
decrease  in  income  inequality,  and  if  the  community  has  a  strong  and  vocal  consensus  in  their  
opposition  to  derogatory  language  (McLaren,  Neundorf  &  Peterson,  2020;  Paluck  &  Chue,  
2017).  Strong  norms  against  hate  speech  promote  a  more  hospitable  environment  for  
diversification  in  society.  And  as  time  and  diversity  progress  simultaneously,  the  majority  
increasingly  tends  to  have  a  positive  outlook  or  regard  towards  minorities.  Through  ‘inoculation’  
of  sorts,  each  new  group  requesting  a  place  in  society  makes  the  process  easier  for  the  next--as  
society  becomes  accustomed  to  the  social  practice  of  opening  space  for  those  who  are  different.  
In  societies  characterized  by  minimized  permission  for  speech,  fear  of  punishment  by  
government  authorities  can  result  in  self-censorship.  Individuals  who  self-censor  due  to  the  
conflict  between  their  views  and  the  government’s  views  (e.g.  McCarthyism)  lack  a  space  to  air  
their  grievances.  Consider  how  digital  domestic  surveillance  generates  anxiety  for  significant  
portions  of  Americans.  An  increase  in  domestic  intelligence  gathering  has  been  demonstrated  to  
influence  online  behavior  (causing  some  people  to  avoid  contexts  they  fear  the  government  may  
find  suspicious)  and  create  a  documentable  chilling  effect  on  online  political  discourse  (Best,  
Krueger,  &  Pearson-Merkowitz,  2012;  O’Connor  &  Jahan,  2014;  Robinson  &  Tannenberg,  2019;  
Stoycheff  et.  al.,  2019).  As  it  has  online  and  in  other  domains  (e.g.  sodomy  laws,  Red  Scare)  the  
looming  threat  of  reprehension  for  expressing  particular  ideas  functions  as  a  government  
panopticon  that  can  extinguish  and  chill  the  expression  and  circulation  of  ideas  and  identities  
disliked  by  the  government  (Lugg,  2006;  Stoycheff  et.  al.  2019).  In  these  contexts,  the  
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government  regulates  the  realm  of  permissibly  expressible  ideas.  Even  if  the  government’s  
position  on  the  ideas  they  suppress  are  morally  ambiguous,  (although  it  is  clear  they  have  more  
leeway  than  minorities)  the  majority  is  not  exempt  from  reprehension  for  disagreeing  with  the  
dominant,  government-endorsed  position  (e.g.  the  lynching  of  white  allies  in  the  19th  and  20th  
century 1 ).  Thus,  even  a  majority  opposed  to  the  government’s  position  will  chill  their  speech--  
further  stifling  the  feasibility  of  opposition.   
In  the  absence  of  opposition,  if  the  majority  is  empowered  by  the  ideology  the  
government  supports,  their  incentive  to  speak  out  against  an  immoral  government  ideology  is  
reduced.  Stagnation  arises  as  a  result  of  the  disincentivizing  respective  power  reduction  the  
majority  would  incur  by  effectively  assisting  minorities  with  the  costly  task  of  dismantling  the  
ideology.  Additionally,  when  speech  is  siphoned  to  the  point  where  a  limited  number  of  linguistic  
networks  have  accessible  persuasive  power,  the  easiest  cognitive  route  is  to  think  in  terms  of  the  
dominating  narrative--that  which  is  hegemonically  perpetuated  and  favors  the  domination  of  the  
ruling  group.  Ideologies  are  linguistic  networks  which  structure  a  set  of  interwoven  beliefs  and  
attitudes  into  a  particular  structure  for  making  sense  of  the  world.  Ideologies  construct  a  
framework  to  explain  social,  political,  and  economic  relations  through  a  rhetorically  blinding  
web.  It  becomes  impossible  to  explain  alternative  viewpoints  if  the  language  has  evolved  to  
favor  one  understanding  of  the  world  while  naturally  discounting  others.  Hegemonically  
dominant  ideologies  function  as  the  master  narrative  of  a  society,  which  has  a  tendency  to  
become  internalized  by  the  population  and  self-perpetuating.  Hegemonic  ideologies  are  
immutably  present  throughout  history,  location,  and  context;  they  are  the  dominant  narratives,  
value  systems,  and  corresponding  linguistic  networks  used  to  uphold  and  legitimize  power,  
hierarchy,  and  “normalcy”  in  culture.  The  rhetorical  power  ingrained  hegemonic  ideologies  yield  
are  socially  and  cognitively  perpetuated  without  force.  When  the  ability  to  circulate  oppositional  
perspectives  is  stifled,  this  effect  is  inflated--demeaning  oppositional  ideas  as  “unnatural,”  
“weird,”  or  “unpatriotic,”  and  causing  individuals  to  self-censor  their  expression  to  avoid  
reprimand  or  reason  their  thoughts  to  cohere  with  the  dominant  narrative  (O’Connor  &  Jahan,  
2014;  Palczewski,  Ice  &  Fritch,  2016;  Robinson  &  Tannenberg,  2019;  Westen,  2007).   
Governments  which  use  regionally  based  election  systems  to  allocate  a  substantial  
portion  of  political  power  are  not  likely  to  support  protection  for  the  most  disparaged  groups  
1  NAACP,  2021  
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because  they  are  elected  by  a  particular  constituency  with  particularized  interests,  not  the  
collective  population  of  the  country.  Especially  without  term  limits,  these  officials  conduct  their  
political  action  with  the  motivation  of  maintaining  their  office  through  continuous  re-election,  or  
minimally,  maintaining  a  positive  public  image  (at  least  to  their  voting  coalition/community  of  
origin)  for  a  positive  continued  social  existence  in  their  community  after  holding  office.  In  
office,  it  is  their  sworn  responsibility  to  serve  their  constituents  (what  model  of  representation  
they  choose  is  irrelevant).  They  advocate  for  policy  intended  to  positively  impact  the  well-being  
of  some,  or  all,  of  their  (voting)  constituents.  If  not,  for  policy  their  constituents  are  oblivious  to,  
or  minimally,  policy  they  can  convince  their  voting  constituents  to  tolerate.  Adding  an  additional  
layer,  their  constituents  have  competing  interests  which  favor  the  distribution  of  power  in  
particular  allotments  to  particular  groups.  It  would  oppositional  to  an  elected  official’s  driving  
motivators  to  propose  a  policy  that  would  disadvantage  or  upset  their  constituents  regardless  of  
its  prospect  for  bringing  a  nation  a  step  closer  to  holistic  social,  political,  or  economic  equality.  
Even  nationally  elected  leaders  obtain  their  position  by  a  voting  coalition  with  particular,  
nonuniversal  interests.  Successful  political  narratives,  even  on  the  national  level,  establish  an  
antagonist  to  motivate  voting  (Westen,  2007).  Furthermore,  the  majority  tends  to  silence  and  
ostracize  the  most  oppressed  minorities  (particularly  those  who  meaningfully  stand  in  opposition  
to  the  dominant  ideology);  keeping  them  from  political  power  if  possible.  Even  as  one  previously  
oppressed  group  is  advocated  for  in  government  policy,  there  is  always  a  group  that  is  
unknowingly  or  intentionally  excluded  to  justify  the  uplifted  group’s  desert  to  equity.  
  
Connection  to  Violence  and  Crime  
How  then  does  this  relate  to  expressions  of  violence  or  hate  crimes?  Hate  crimes  are  
innately  intertwined  with  the  drive  to  maintain  social  dominance.  The  structural  inequality  
hegemonic  ideologies  frequently  create  promote  violence  and  crimes  of  intimidation  (Krieger  &  
Meierrieks,  2019;  Krishnan,  2005;  Vélez,  Krivo  &  Peterson,  2003).  There  are  four  documented  
motives  of  hate  crime  perpetrators:  thrill  seeking,  retaliation,  defensive,  and  mission  based  
(McDevitt,  Levin,  Bennett,  2002).  Inevitably,  those  in  power  are  motivated  to  stay  in  power,  and  
the  dominant  hegemonic  ideology  upholds  social  hierarchy,  promoting  the  majority’s  felt  
entitlement  to  power  and  privilege.  When  there  is  weakness  in  the  hegemonic  facade,  violence  or  
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intimidation  is  necessary  to  silence  dissent  and  maintain  dominance  (Choi,  2017).  By  nature,  
ideas  opposing  the  dominant  ideology  endanger  the  existing  societal  order.   
A  nation  with  limited  speech  permits  some  speech  and  limits  other  speech;  thus,  it  favors  
the  language  of  some  dominating  ideology  and  restricts  language  in  opposition  to  that  
perspective.  Since  those  in  power  are  likely  to  favor  ideologies  which  legitimize  their  power,  
there  is  ultimately  an  ostracized  group  who  dissents  to  that  group’s  accumulation  of  power.  A  
national  perpetuation  of  one  dominating  ideology  ostracizes  dissenters,  deepening  inequality  and  
distrust  by  targeting  those  who  protest  their  undermined  sense  of  agency  in  society.  Ultimately,  
people  subjected  to  structural  inequality  and  threatened  into  ideological  conformity  are  
oppressed.  If  only  the  government’s  preferred  ideology  is  permitted,  some  group  (opposition)  is  
ultimately  silenced,  and  means  of  reprimand  will  breed  to  extinguish  opposition.  Frequently,  
those  means  of  reprimand  take  the  form  of  hate  crimes.  Thus,  a  more  limited  range  of  speech  
will  increase  a  nation’s  propensity  for  hate  crimes.  And  importantly,  from  my  perspective,  the  
opposite  is  also  true  –  expanding  what  is  considered  free  speech  should  similarly  have  a  positive  
effect  on  reducing  the  likelihood  of  hate  crimes.  
  
Hypothesis  1:  As  more  speech  is  permitted  by  government,  the  nationwide  
propensity  for  hate  crimes  decreases.  
  
Methods  
To  address  these  questions,  I  employ  an  observational  analysis  of  the  United  States  to  
assess  the  relationship  between  the  restriction  of  expression  (my  explanatory  variable)  and  
prejudice-motivated  violence  (my  depending  variable  or  outcome  of  interest).  I  analyze  how  the  
First  Amendment  has  been  interpreted  throughout  the  past  century  in  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  (in  
terms  of  permitted  or  suppressed  expression)  as  it  relates  to  the  number  of  recorded  hate  crimes  
per  year.  Other  methods,  including  experimental  approaches,  would  likely  be  less  useful  because  
this  research  is  ultimately  intertwined  with  an  entire  country’s  cultural  development  over  an  
extensive  period  of  time.  Despite  the  benefits  of  that  research  design,  the  organic  development  of  
a  holistic  culture  over  a  century  cannot  be  replicated  in  an  experimental  setting.  The  advantage  of  
doing  a  historical  observational  analysis  is  that  it  is  accurately  impacted  by  cultural  development.  
To  chart  these  patterns  throughout  the  20th  and  21st  centuries,  I  qualitatively  analyzed  
data  from  the  Supreme  Court’s  written  decision  reasonings  from  major  Supreme  Court  cases  
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dating  from  1919  to  2019.  This  data  is  from  the  Seventh  Edition  of  the  University  Casebook  
Series  “First  Amendment  Law”  (Feldman  and  Sullivan  2019).  I  selected  75  landmark  cases  
considered  by  experts  in  the  field  to  demonstrate  the  evolution  of  court  doctrine  over  the  past  
century,  then  randomly  selected  50  cases  from  that  list  to  analyze.  I  created  a  Free  Speech  Index  
to  categorically  rank  the  cases  by  answering  ten  questions  about  each  ruling  (see  Figure  1).  The  
Free  Speech  Index  establishes  a  scale  to  measure  each  ruling’s  level  of  illiberal  expression  
restriction  based  on  the  relative  dangers  presented  by  the  constitutional  question  in  each  case.  
The  scale  ranges  from  0%  representing  complete  totalitarian  rule  to  100%  representing  free  
speech  absolutism.  In  order  to  avoid  ranking  all  restricted  speech  overly  close  to  0%,  the  
measurement  assesses  the  facts  of  the  cases  as  well  as  the  Court’s  reasoning  for  the  ruling,  rather  
than  just  the  ruling  itself.   
Since  my  focus  is  on  the  speech  examined  by  the  Supreme  Court,  I  began  with  the  
premise  that  the  majority  of  expression  not  challenged  in  court  is  permitted,  and  the  speech  
restricted  by  ranking  entities  of  the  criminal  justice  system  follows  the  guidelines  outlined  by  
these  court  rulings. 2   Thus,  the  starting  position  for  measurement  was  100%  as  unrestricted  
speech  equates  to  free  speech  absolutism,  and  the  fullness  of  that  absolutism  is  diminished  by  
rulings  restricting  the  extent  of  free  speech.  Restrictions  upon  the  liberty  of  expression  bring  the  
parameters  of  legal  public  expression  closer  to  totalitarianism,  measured  at  0%.   
The  index  questions  were  designed  to  cover  a  wide  typography  of  free  speech  cases.  
More  questions  target  punished  speech  than  permitted  speech  since  cases  which  permit  speech  
can  only  reduce  free  speech  absolutism  when  the  Court  alludes  to  the  possibility  of  speech  
restriction  in  related  circumstances  (which  may  have  created  a  chilling  effect  on  future  speech).  
Three  questions  have  a  potential  to  raise  a  case’s  score  to  reflect  when  a  ruling  contains  caveats  
that  alleviate  the  damage  of  the  speech  restriction  or  restricted  speech  because  it  was  
demonstrably  necessary  to  ensure  the  liberties  of  others  (see  Figure  1).  
It  is  important  to  note  the  potential  for  personal  bias  in  this  examination.  The  questions  I  
asked  were  designed  to  solicit  a  clear  response,  but  the  cases  they  are  applied  to  can  be  argued  to  
emphasize  a  diverse  array  of  interests.  For  example,  Question  4  asks,  “Are  there  other  routes  for  
2  I  acknowledge  this  assumption  presumes  the  idealized  enactment  of  the  criminal  justice  system’s  procedures,  and  
there  are  likely  many  incidents  where  speech  has  been  restricted  or  punished  despite  the  Court  having  previously  
ruled  to  permit  such  expression.  If  speech  is  limited  without  Court  record  or  outside  of  the  Court’s  ruled  allowances,  
it  does  not  have  a  marked  effect  on  the  documented  interpretation  of  the  First  Amendment  in  law  overtime.   
  
13  
communicating  this  message?”  Yet,  what  exactly  makes  an  alternative  route  of  communication  
less  effective?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  necessarily  subjective,  but  the  methods  of  this 
analysis  demanded  I  employed  conscious  judgement  to  put  aside  individual  preferences  and  use  
the  information  in  the  holdings,  concurrences,  and  dissents  to  come  to  the  most  balanced  
conclusion  between  the  different  arguments.  
  
Figure  1 :  Free  Speech  Index  Questions  
  
The  dependent  variable  measured  the  annual  number  of  hate  crimes  committed  
throughout  the  past  century  in  the  United  States  from  1918-2018.  Hate  crime  victimization  is  
measured  as  the  people  victimized  to  hate  crimes  each  year  during  this  period.  This  includes  a  
broad  range  of  crimes,  such  as  simple  and  aggravated  assault,  intimidation,  murder,  rape,  arson,  
and  destruction  of  property,  among  others.  Incidents  which  were  not  criminalized  or  convicted  
were  included  if  the  action  committed  constitutes  any  of  these  illegal  crimes,  and  if  they  were  
  
Free  Speech  Index  
If  speech  is  punished  or  prohibited…  
1. Is  the  idea  contained  in  the  speech  unpopular  
or  disliked  by  the  government?  (Yes  -10%)  
(To  some  -5%)  (No,  unstated  or  unclear  0%)  
2. Is  the  asserted  harm  of  the  speech…  
(Unlikely?  -15%)  (Possible?  -10%)  (Present  
and  petty  -5%)  (Present  and  significant  -2%)  
3. Is  there  a  legitimate,  substantial,  or  
immediate  danger  presented  by  permitting  
the  speech?  (No  -10%)  (Maybe  -5%)  (Yes  
0%)  
4. Are  there  other  routes  for  communicating  this  
message?  (No  obvious  alternatives  -10%)  
(Less  effective,  accessible,  or  compromised  
alternatives  -5%)  (Bountiful  alternatives  
+5%)  
5. Is  the  speech  restricted  despite  there  being  no  
infringement  on  the  liberties  or  rights  of  
another?  (Yes  -15%)  (Unclear  0%)  (Someone  
else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  at  risk  +3%)  
(No,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  
infringed  upon  +5%)  (No,  someone  else’s  
liberties  or  rights  were  severely  infringed  
upon  +10%)  
6. Does  the  ruling  clearly  risk  having  a  chilling  
effect  on  the  breadth  of  future  speech?  (Yes  
-10%)  (Maybe  or  to  a  slight  degree  0%)  (No  
+10%)  
7. Is  the  speech  political  or  politicized?  (Yes  
-10%)  (Indirectly  -5%)  (No  0%)  
8. Does  the  ruling  not  consider  an  act  of  “pure  
speech”  (traditionally  written  or  verbal)  and  
criminalize  a  particular  act  of  symbolic  
speech  that  was  intended  as  expression  from  
protection?  (Yes  -10%)  (Potentially  -5%)  (No  
or  N/A  0%)  
9. Does  the  ruling  involve  obscenity  or  similar  
categories  and  restrict  what  types  of  content  
or  information  available  to  consenting  
adults?  (Yes  -10%)  (Somewhat,  but  there  is  
other  similar  content  available  -5%)  (No  or  
N/A  0%)  
If  speech  is  permitted…  
10. Are  there  other  speech  restrictions  in  the  
ruling  such  as  hypotheticals  or  alluded  
judgement  on  related  issues  that  may  have  a  
chilling  effect  on  future  speech  or  
expression?  (Yes,  greatly  -15%)  (Yes  -10%)  
(Yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well-defined,  and  
necessary  to  ensure  a  significant  public  
interest  -5%)  (No  or  N/A  0%)  
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perceived  by  the  victim  or  historians  to  be  bias-motivated  due  to  the  recorded  context  of  the  
assault.   
The  most  prominent  confound  in  this  study  is  the  deficient  historical  record  of  hate  
crimes.  Unfortunately,  the  FBI  federal  database  for  hate  crimes  from  the  FBI  only  traces  back  to  
1992  and  is  limited  in  scope  to  hate  crimes  reported  to  and  recorded  by  the  police.  Before  the  
Hate  Crime  Statistics  Act  of  1990,  “hate  crimes  were  lumped  together  with  such  offenses  as  
homicide,  assault,  rape,  robbery,  and  arson”  (American  Psychological  Association,  1998).  
Additionally,  the  term  “hate  crime”  has  only  been  in  common  usage  since  the  1980s  (Office  of  
Justice  Programs,  2021).  In  order  to  compensate  for  these  limitations,  I  aggregated  data  reporting  
United  States’  hate  crime  victimization  using  a  large  conglomerate  of  data  sources  recording  
prejudice-motivated  violence  from  1918-2018.  Sources  included  FBI  Hate  Crime  Statistics,  
Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics  from  the  National  Crime  Victimization  Survey,  the  Anti-Defamation  
League,  the  Tuskegee  University  Lynching  Archives,  BlackPast.org,  various  books,  and  local  
newspapers.  Due  to  the  severe  impact  of  this  confound  on  the  results  of  this  study,  the  
implications  of  this  data  deficiency  are  expanded  upon  in  this  article’s  discussion.  
I  compared  the  available  data  from  both  variables  by  arranging  their  findings  on  temporal  
graphs,  one  depicting  the  evolution  of  Supreme  Court  free  speech  rulings  over  the  past  century,  
and  the  other  depicting  my  collected  record  of  hate  crimes  committed  over  that  same  century  
(Figures  2  and  4).  From  here,  I  analyzed  the  connections  between  the  data  and  drew  conclusions  
about  the  relationship  between  the  two  variables.  Finally,  I  explored  plausible  explanations  for  
the  findings  to  examine  the  relationship  between  tolerance  for  free  speech  in  law  and  a  nation’s  
tendency  for  hate  crimes.  
These  methods  do  not  permit  me  to  make  causal  claims  given  the  observational  and  
necessarily  somewhat  subjective  nature  of  this  study.  This  research  is  nonetheless  useful  because  
it  offers  a  detailed  examination  of  the  United  States  from  a  historical  perspective,  providing  a  
wealth  of  information  about  the  expression  of  American  cultural  dynamics  in  liberty,  tolerance,  
and  violence  through  the  20th  and  21st  century.  In  political  science,  this  research  speaks  to  the  
function  of  free  speech  in  society  and  effectiveness  of  the  United  States’  approach  to  balancing  
the  tensions  between  civil  liberties  and  civil  rights.  Additionally,  it  presents  considerations  for  
interpreting  the  historical  account  of  hate  crime  records  and  complicates  the  image  of  the  state’s  




Supreme  Court  Cases  
The  data  from  the  Supreme  Court  case  analysis  produces  a  clear  trend  of  the  Court’s  
liberalization  in  its  First  Amendment  free  speech  interpretation.  The  analysis  begins  in  1919  as  it  
was  not  common  for  the  Court  to  meaningfully  address  the  First  Amendment  before  the  
Incorporation  Doctrine--which  necessitated  that  state  laws  do  not  violate  the  First  
Amendment--was  announced  in  1925  by  the  Gitlow  v.  New  York  ruling.    
The  court  cases’  index  scores’  upper  limit  trends  indicate  the  Court’s  willingness  over  
time  to  allow  controversial  speech.  The  lower  limit  trends  indicate  the  Court’s  willingness  over  
time  to  flirt  with  totalitarian,  arbitrary  restriction  of  unpopular  speech.  By  a  linear  equation,  both  
the  upper  and  lower  limit  liberalized  at  a  similar  rate.  Meaning,  among  cases  the  Court  ruled  in  
favor  of  free  speech,  they  became  more  willing  to  rule  in  ways  which  were  permissive  to  a  wider  
array  of  circumstances  and  views.  Simultaneously,  in  cases  restricting  speech,  the  Court  grew  
less  willing  to  allow  government  to  suppress  speech  over  time  without  conditioning  the  ruling  
and/or  giving  well  founded  explanation  for  the  ruling  (commonly  characterized  by  a  judicial   
  





balance  between  competing  interests).  As  time  progressed,  the  Court  developed  a  stronger  norm  
against  extremely  totalitarian  rulings  suppressing  free  speech.  Further,  it  ruled  increasingly  in  
favor  of  controversial  speech.  The  average  index  scores  indicate  that  overtime,  the  court  more  
frequently  ruled  to  allow  controversial  or  contested  speech  while  also  ruling  less  frequently  to  
restrict  speech  without  objective  and  substantial  reason(s)  (see  Figure  2;  full  analyses  and  
scoring  of  individual  cases  are  available  in  Appendix  C).  
Indeed,  the  most  transitional  year  for  the  Court’s  increases  in  free  speech  liberalism  is  
1969.  That  year,  the  case  rulings  flip  from  most  cases  scoring  below  the  total  average  case  index  
score  of  the  entire  measured  history  to  most  cases  scoring  above  that  mean  score  (see  Figure  3).  
This  judicial  flip  may  have  been  a  response  to  the  turbulent  events  of  1968,  a  year  considered  by  
historians  to  be  uniquely  transformative,  given  the  degraded  public  support  for  the  Vietnam  War  
  




after  the  Tet  Offensive,  Martin  Luther  King  Jr.’s  assassination,  the  Columbia  University  revolt,  
the  assassination  of  Robert  F.  Kennedy,  the  clash  between  protestors  and  police  outside  of  the  
Democratic  National  Convention  in  Chicago,  and  more  (Isserman  &  Kazin,  2015).  The  Court  
dataset  did  not  measure  a  case  from  1968,  but  the  three  cases  measured  in  1969  began  a  era  of  
markedly  more  tolerant  rulings  on  controversial  ideas.  
  
Hate  Crime  Victimization  
The  data  from  hate  crime  victimization  was  erratic  and  demonstrated  a  steep  increase  in  
the  number  of  reported  hate  crimes  starting  in  1980.  Additionally,  the  reported  victimizations  
surged  dramatically  from  2003-2015  due  to  the  availability  of  more  encompassing  hate  crime  
reports  from  the  Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics’  National  Crime  Victimization  Survey  (note  the  
broken  scale  in  Figure  4).  The  FBI  data  recorded  ranged  from  1991  to  2018  and  did  not  depict  
any  significant  trends  when  it  was  isolated  from  the  other  data  sources  (see  Appendix  E  for  
graph  of  FBI  Hate  Crime  Victimization  data).  There  is  a  gap  in  the  data  from  1969  to  1972,  and  
1974  to  1976,  where  I  was  unable  to  locate  any  hate  crime  reports.  The  vast  majority  of  the  data  
from  the  first  half  of  the  century  (1918-1968)  is  from  the  Tuskegee  University  lynching  archives.  
This  is  supplemented  by  detailed  accounts  of  race  riots  as  reported  by  BlackPast.org .  In  
interpreting  this  data,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  United  States  population  more  than  tripled  
between  1918  and  2018,  growing  from  103.2  million  to  327.2  million  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  
1919;  2019).  See  Figure  4  for  total  recorded  annual  victimizations.   
The  results  of  this  variable  were  highly  dependent  upon  the  sources  available  and  the  
emergent  attention  hate  crimes  gained  over  the  past  century.  The  increase  in  the  number  of  hate  
crimes  reported  starting  in  1980  directly  correlates  to  when  the  term  “hate  crime”  entered  the  
common  vernacular.  The  records  prior  were  not  collected  by  the  government,  but  by  advocacy  
groups  and  academics.  In  total,  only  scarce  historical  records  were  obtainable.  Presumably,  most  
hate  crimes  went  unreported  during  this  period  due  to  the  culture  of  the  time.  Up  until  1963,  the  
records  exclusively  tabulate  lynching  and  riot-intwined  hate  crimes  committed  against  Black  
Americans.  Since  1964,  the  recorded  hate  crimes  expanded  to  include  victimizations  of  gay  and  
lesbian  people,  Jewish  people,  and  finally  a  broad  range  of  groups  once  the  government  began  








The  reporting  entities  produced  very  different  ranges  of  reported  incidents  because  they  
had  different  resources  available  for  creating  their  data  sets,  they  varied  by  the  population,  crime,  
locale,  and/or  time  period  organizations  were  attempting  to  record,  and  groups  attempting  to  
record  all  hate  crimes  against  a  population  differed  how  they  determined  an  incident  qualified  as  
a  “hate  crime.”  For  example,  the  Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics  included  crimes  reported  to  the  
police  and  unreported  crimes  "perceived  by  the  victims  to  be  bias-motivated  because  the  
offender  used  hate  language  or  left  behind  hate  symbols''  (Langton,  2017)  and  some  advocacy  
groups  report  unconfirmed  incidents  from  anonymous  sources.  Meanwhile,  the  FBI  only  records  
convicted  crimes  reported  to  and  recorded  by  the  police,  many  police  departments  do  not  
participate  in  hate  crime  data  collection,  and  hate  crimes  are  commonly  underreported  by  victims  
(FBI  Uniform  Crime  Report,  2018;  Department  of  Justice,  1997).  
The  distinction  between  major  historical  events  of  racial  violence  in  the  first  and  second  
half  of  the  20th  century  is  prominently  between  the  acting  capacity  of  the  people  inflicting  
violence  upon  Black  Americans.  The  first  half  of  the  century’s  racial  violence  was  marked  by  the  
tendency  toward  brutal  “race  riots,”  in  which  towns  across  the  country  would  intermittently  be  
provoked  into  anarchical  race-based  violence.  These  riots  could  last  days  and  were  
predominantly  characterized  by  white  towns  men  banning  together  to  assault  and  murder  Black  
townspeople,  frequently  burning  their  homes  and  destroying  their  property  in  the  process.  Black  
townspeople  defended  themselves  by  fighting  back,  and  frequently  became  homeless  or  left  
town.  For  example,  a  notable  race  riot  in  1923  resulted  in  the  complete  desertion  of  the  Florida  
town  Rosewood,  in  Levy  County.  After  rumors  had  spread  to  nearby  white  communities  of  Black  
on  white  violence,  a  group  of  200  white  men  from  surrounding  towns  attacked  the  Black  
residents  of  Rosewood,  slaughtered  their  animals,  and  burned  all  but  two  buildings  in  the  town  
(BlackPast.org,  2021;  History,  2020;  the  Washington  Post,  1993;).   
While  the  race  riots  of  the  first  half  of  the  first  half  of  the  century  were  characterized  by  
white  civilian  violence,  the  racial  violence  within  “urban  uprisings''  of  the  century’s  second  half  
was  committed  by  police  officers.  The  apparent  stagnation  of  racially  based  violence  from  
1950-1980  should  not  be  attributed  to  an  actual  stagnation  of  violence.  Rather,  this  reported  
stagnation  is  merely  a  result  of  the  legalization  of  racial  violence  via  its  execution  through  
officials  operating  in  their  state-sanctioned  capacity.  White  violence  was  committed  within  white  
peoples’  capacity  as  individuals  during  the  first  half  of  the  century,  and  in  uniform  during  the  
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second  half  of  the  century.  This  is  not  to  say  that  white  actors  were  convicted  for  racial  violence  
before  1950;  race  riots  commonly  resulted  in  the  arrests  of  Black  people,  not  white  people,  and  
often  for  unspecified  reasons.  
Although  I  was  not  able  to  create  a  holistic  account  of  the  total  annual  hate  crimes  
committed  over  the  past  century,  the  data  represents  an  account  of  the  hate  crimes  recorded  over  
the  past  century,  albeit  likely  an  incomplete  account.  The  deficiencies  in  the  accessible  data  
demonstrate  several  important  conclusions  about  the  intertwinement  of  data  collection,  history,  
and  culture.  Particularly  before  the  digital  age,  the  examination  of  history  by  today’s  moral  
standards  is  bordered  by  the  tendency  of  the  hegemonic  group  to  collect  data  merely  as  it  
resonates  with  their  interests  and  ideas  of  what  is  important  to  remember.  History  is  ultimately  
recorded  and  reframed  through  a  multitude  of  lenses  as  time  goes  on,  but  when  records  of  who  
was  assaulted  in  a  particular  town  in  1943  were  never  created,  there  is  no  way  to  retrieve  
knowledge  about  the  lost  events  of  the  past.  The  historical  record  is  filtered  through  the  people  
present  on  that  day,  the  culture  the  history  occurred  in,  culture  and  historians  of  the  past,  and  the  
culture  and  historians  of  the  present.  Since  it  was  likely  commonplace  and  morally  justified  for  
white  men  to  degrade  women,  people  of  color,  and  LGBT  people,  it  is  not  incongruent  that  no  
collective  effort  was  made  to  write  down  the  number  of  these  people  hurt  on  a  given  day  (or  if  
anyone  did,  that  those  records  are  submerged).  
 
Discussion  
My  theoretical  expectations  predicted  that  as  more  speech  became  legally  permitted  by  
the  federal  court,  the  tendency  for  hate  crimes  to  be  committed  in  a  country  would  decrease.  The  
aggregate  hate  crime  data  clearly  reveals  an  increase  in  the  number  of  hate  crimes  recorded  over  
the  past  century  even  though  the  data  was  extraordinarily  erratic  due  to  resource  availability  and  
significant  discrepancies  between  the  data  collection  methods  of  primary  sources.  Given  that  
many  hate  crimes  were  not  initially  interpreted  as  crimes  in  the  early  20th  century,  were  not  
categorically  separated  from  other  crimes  in  the  mid-20th  century,  and  were  not  labeled  as  “hate  
crimes''  until  the  1980s,  the  increase  in  the  number  of  recorded  hate  crime  victimizations  is  not  
substantial  evidence  to  conclude  that  the  nation’s  actual  propensity  for  hate  crimes  increased  
over  the  past  century;  rather,  the  data  implies  that  the  national  tendency  to  record  hate  crimes  
increased.  Additionally,  priority  differences  between  U.S.  government,  historians,  and  advocacy  
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groups  manifest  in  strikingly  distinct  methods  of  hate  crime  data  collection.  As  time  progressed  
the  national  culture  became  increasingly  concerned  with  the  salience  of  documenting  and  
addressing  the  violence  committed  against  minorities,  most  notably  in  the  past  40  years.  
Additional  research  could  undertake  the  task  of  creating  a  more  complete  account  of  hate  crimes  
committed  in  the  20th  century,  however  this  is  likely  an  impossible  task.  Simply  put,  it  is  hard  to  
find  hate  crime  data  because  the  dominant  culture--specifically  white  people  in  America--did  not  
find  hate  crimes  notable  enough  to  record.  The  best  records  of  the  early  20th  century  in  this  
research  was  Black  historians’  records  of  people  victimized  by  race  riots  and  lynchings.  Those  
records  are  distant  from  the  surface  of  the  internet.  
This  hollowed  record  of  history  speaks  directly  to  my  theory--hegemonic  ideology  
discounts  the  experiences  of  those  it  oppresses.  While  word  of  a  Black  man  raping  white  women  
was  cause  for  newspaper  articles,  lynchings,  devastatingly  deadly  race  riots--historical  records  of  
white  men  raping  Black  women  is  eerily  vacant  (Equal  Justice  Initiative,  2017).  During  this  time  
people  were  pressured  to  heed  to  social  hierarchy  and  certainly,  leave  it  unchallenged.  The  only  
recorded  violence  against  oppressed  people  was  publicized  violence  intended  to  broadcast  the  
reprimandation  of  minorities  suspected  of  challenging  the  hegemonic  ideology.  The  violent  
execution  and  arson  of  Black  communities  were  published  in  newspapers  because  the  
intimidation-laden  publicity  was  advantageous  for  maintaining  racial  hierarchy  and  contributed  
to  the  legitimization  of  hegemony.  In  the  early  20th  century,  challenging  the  dominant  ideology  
resulted  in  violent  social  condemnation.  Oppositional  speech  did  not  see  great  prospect  in  the  
Court  either.  
This  half  of  the  20th  century  was  not  a  period  of  vibrant  free  speech.  In  this  study,  all  of  
the  Supreme  Court  rulings  from  1919-1957  permitted  government  to  restrict  speech  it  found  
harmful  or  potentially  harmful. 3   The  most  immediately  present  harm  in  any  of  the  cases  
restricting  free  speech  was  in  Chaplinsky  v.  New  Hampshire  (1942),  which  ruled  to  punish  
Chaplinsky’s  offensive,  peace-disturbing  speech  using  a  New  Hampshire  law  against  
“address(ing)  any  offensive,  derisive,  or  annoying  word  to  any  other  person  who  is  lawfully  in 
any  street  or  other  public  place,  nor  call(ing)  him  by  any  offensive  or  derisive  name  [emphasis  
added].”  This  and  the  other  non-sedition  case  in  this  time  period  ruled  against  challenges  to  
3  Nine  cases  were  measured  during  this  38-year  time  period.  This  is  largely  because  there  were  less  free  speech  cases  
which  actually  were  deliberated  in  the  Supreme  Court  during  this  time  period.  
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religious  norms.  Socially  and  legally,  speech  was  silenced  because  it  stood  in  opposition  to  
hegemony.   
My  research  further  implies  that  the  patterns  of  socially  and  legally  enforced  silence  are  
motivated  to  maintain  a  lack  of  opposition  to  the  hegemonic  ideology  in  public  dialogue.  This  
has  serious  implications  for  the  prospect  of  legal  hate  speech  restrictions.  Consider  how  other  
restrictions  on  free  speech  were  justified.  Sedition  cases,  as  one  prominent  example,  argued  that  
some  political  beliefs  were  so  dangerous  to  the  continuation  of  organized  government  that  they  
must  be  extinguished  (Schenck  v.  U.S.,  Abrams  v.  U.S.,  Gitlow  v.  NY,  Whitney  v.  CA).  Yet,  the  
expression  in  these  cases  was  relatively  harmless  to  government  preservation,  given  that  the  
expression  occurred  without  provoking  government  overthrow.   
For  example,  in  the  Whitney  v.  California  ruling  Justice  Stanford  writes,  “A  state  may  
punish  those  who  abuse  freedom  of  speech  by  utterances  inimical  to  the  public  welfare,  tending  
to  [...]  endanger  the  foundations  of  organized  government  and  threaten  to  overthrow  by  unlawful  
means”  (1927).  While  it  may  seem  reasonable  to  argue  that  a  government  has  a  right  to  
self-preservation,  let  us  examine  the  cost  in  this  particular  instance.  This  case  convicts  a  woman  
for  being  a  part  of  a  group  seeking  political  change.  The  group  considered  the  possibility  of  
unlawful  means  to  obtain  political  change,  but  the  woman  urged  the  group  against  illegal  action.  
She  was  convicted  for  being  a  part  of  a  group  that  had  pondered  the  idea.  While  a  government  
may  have  a  right  to  self-preservation,  if  the  legitimacy  of  democratic  government  rests  in  the  
public’s  consent  to  be  governed,  a  liberal  democracy  creates  risky  internal  contradictions  by  
extinguishing  legitimate  political  deliberation.  This  case  is  not  an  anomaly;  many  other  cases  
during  this  time  period  similarly  restricted  unpopular  speech  by  the  Bad  Tendency  rational  
(despite  some  Justices’  attempts  to  frame  their  use  of  this  doctrine  as  the  Clear  and  Present  
Danger  doctrine. 4 )  Many  of  these  rulings  effectively  criminalized  publicly  relevant  viewpoints  
the  government  opposed.  
The  compelling  arguments  for  hate  speech  laws  should  not  be  accepted  without  
considering  that  arguments  for  far-reaching  sedition  laws  were  also  compelling.  Both  arguments  
demonize  a  group  with  an  unpopular  opinion  and  prophesize  tragic  consequences  if  that  group  is  
able  to  continue  expressing  their  ideas.  It  is  not  my  argument  that  hate  speech  is  not  degrading  to  
the  health  and  well-being  of  targeted  minorities,  nor  is  this  harm  unimportant.  Instead,  I  forewarn  
4  Herbeck  &  Tedford,  2017  
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that  legitimizing  government’s  authority  to  suppress  expression--whether  it  be  seditious  speech  
or  derogatory  speech--allows  government  to  determine  which  speech,  ideas,  and  speakers  are  
permissible,  and  punish  those  which  are  not.  Government  is  not  immune  from  acting  unjustly,  as  
it  is  made  up  by  a  body  of  people  guided  by  their  own  perceptions  of  the  world,  as  well  as  their  
motivation  to  remain  in  power 5   by  pleasing  whoever  keeps  them  in  power.  
The  data  from  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  and  the  21st  century  demonstrate  a  
dramatic  increase  in  the  breadth  of  legally  expressible  ideas.  Free  speech  cases  during  this  time  
period  shift  away  from  considering  if  government  should  allow  unpopular  speech,  towards  
balancing  conflicting  interests  and  liberties  between  citizens,  organizations,  and  local,  state  and  
federal  government.  For  example,  Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  
Boston  (1995)  considered  whether  private  organizers  of  a  publicly  held  St.  Patrick’s  Day  Parade  
must  allow  the  Boston  GLIB  Group  to  not  only  join  the  parade,  but  be  their  own  unit  in  the  
parade  with  an  identifying  banner  when  a  state  law  forbade  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  sexual  
orientation  in  places  of  public  accommodation.  In  this  case,  the  Court  determined  that  the  private  
group  putting  on  the  parade  has  a  right  to  portray  whatever  message  they  sought  to  communicate  
by  the  parade.  The  GLIB  members  were  not  excluded  from  participating  in  the  parade  as  
individuals,  nor  was  their  message  blocked  as  they  could  have  put  on  their  own  parade.  While  a  
disadvantaged  minority  was  ruled  against  in  this  case,  the  ruling  does  not  silence  minority  
expression  in  society,  and  it  is  well  justified  by  a  balance  of  competing  interests.  
The  Court’s  trend  of  restricting  expression  by  less  arbitrary  factors  during  the  late  20th  
and  21st  century  is  demonstrated  by  the  rising  lower  limit  of  case  index  scores.  Rather  than  
punishing  speech  because  it  challenged  the  dominant  ideology  and  caused  offense  (e.g.  Feiner  v.  
New  York,  1951),  the  Court  gravitated  towards  less  hegemonically  motivated  rulings,  
implementing  an  expansive  vision  of  free  speech  extending  even  towards  expression  
aggressively  opposed  the  dominant  culture  (e.g.  Texas  v.  Johnson,  1989).  Alongside  the  
increased  national  tendency  to  collect  hate  crime  data  near  this  time  period,  these  trends  are  
indicative  of  cultural  change.  Not  only  did  the  media  begin  to  report  on  hate  crime  activity  in  the  
1970s,  activist  groups  began  to  collect  hate  crime  data  as  they  occurred  during  the  1980s,  and  the  
government  began  collecting  national  statistics  on  hate  crimes  in  the  1990s.  Culture  grew  more  
cognizant  of  and  vocal  about  the  experiences  of  oppressed  people  in  society,  likely  via  increasing  
5  Or  minimally,  by  their  motivation  to  avoid  harassment,  violence,  or  remorse  after  holding  office;  
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racial  diversity,  expanding  national  communication  with  technological  advancement,  and  the  
momentum  of  successive  activism  movements 6   (Sandefur  et  al.,  2001).  Social  movement  after  
social  movement,  the  veil  of  hegemony  weakened  as  people  throughout  the  nation  continued  to  
discuss  how  the  dominant  culture  promoted  inequality  and  oppression.  
Yet,  hegemony  is  not  gone.  Rather,  the  scope  and  framework  of  dominant  ideology  has  
shifted.  For  example,  much  of  the  data  collected  from  the  first  half  of  the  century  is  from  
contemporary  advocacy  groups  and  scholars  who  have  pieced  together  historical  records  of  the  
hate-events  they  were  interested  in  (lynchings  and  race  riots).  However,  the  critical  question  
remains:  who  is  being  left  out?  Acts  of  anti-Asian  racism  prompted  by  the  global  COVID-19  
pandemic  have  promoted  public  consideration  of  the  historical  narrative,  or  rather  lack  thereof,  
of  anti-Asian  racism.  While  mainstream  culture  has  overarching  narratives  shaping  our  
understanding  of  what  happened  to  Black  Americans  over  the  past  century  (although  incomplete  
or  biasly  framed  histories ),  we  lack  such  a  cohesive  and  accessible  narrative  of  the  experiences  
of  racism  of  Asian  Americans,  and  certainly  many  other  minorities.  Instead,  the  “model  
minority”  stereotype  (a  product  of  hegemony)  has  contributed  to  the  tendency  to  discount  and  
underemphasize  Asian  Americans’  experiences  of  racism  and  discrimination  (Abdollah  &  
Hughes,  2021;  Hsu,  2021).  The  fact  that  historical  accounts  of  racist  violence  have  only  been  
contemporarily  reconstructed  of  some  minority  groups  but  not  others  indicates  how  
contemporary  society  emphasizes  the  discrimination  experienced  by  some  groups  more  than  
others.  The  point  here  is  not  to  compare  the  plights  of  oppression,  rather  to  direct  our  attention  to  
the  biases  ubiquitously  integrated  within  our  current  culture,  similar  to  America’s  cultural  past.  
While  locating  numerically  accurate  accounts  of  incidents  of  racist  violence  overtime  may  be  a  
cumbersome  or  impossible  task,  a  more  effective  way  to  address  and  placate  current  biases  in  
society  semantically  by  constructing  and  disseminating  emotionally  compelling  narratives  of  the  
histories  and  current  experiences  of  unacknowledged  discrimination.  Allowing  narratives  that  
perpetuate  prejudice  to  go  un-countered  not  only  biases  the  public  to  disregard  truly  
discriminatory  structures  and  behaviors,  but  also  creates  an  illusion  of  false  consensus--allowing  
prejudice  to  remain  unrecognized  (Westen,  2007).  
  
6  I.e.  Civil  rights  movement,  Black  Lives  Matter;  1st,  2nd  and  3rd  wave  feminism,  #MeToo;  Indigenous  rights;  Gay,  
trans  and  queer  rights;  Immigration  activism;  Criminal  justice  reform;  Occupy  movement;  Climate  strikes;  etc.  
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Additionally,  minorities’  oppression  no  longer  takes  the  form  of  normalized  public  
violence,  but  is  manifested  as  state  sponsored  (or  condoned)  violence  and  structural  inequality  
which  promotes  their  disadvantage  in  poorly  moderated  capitalism.  While  there  is  certainly  less  
stigma  around  discussing  the  realities  of  oppression,  the  stigma  is  still  present.  The  power  of  a  
hegemonic  ideology  is  its  elusive  ability  to  transgress  criticism  by  naturalizing  itself  into  the  
structure  of  collective  thought.  Violations  of  human  liberty  are  predominantly  excused  when  they  
are  introduced  through  the  weavings  of  the  dominant  ideological  framework,  as  it  is  convenient  
for  those  in  power.  This  framework  allows  us  to  better  explain  the  U.S.  government’s  pattern  of  
committing  or  condoning  oppression  throughout  history  with  little  immediate  backlash  (e.g.  
slavery,  forced  migration  of  Native  Americans,  restricting  women’s  right  to  participate  in  public  
society,  child  labor,  Jim  Crow  laws,  Japanese  internment  camps,  segregation,  red-lining,  sodomy  
laws,  mass  incarceration,  police  brutality,  discriminatory  TSA  procedures,  refusing  to  regulate  
capitalism,  mass  internet  surveillance,  etc.).  Rather  than  focusing  exclusively  on  the  relationship  
between  the  legal  restriction  of  free  speech  and  societal  desensitization  to  civilian  hate  crimes,  
the  scope  ought  to  broaden  to  acknowledge  the  State’s  influential  role  in  enacting,  perpetuating,  
and  creating  prejudice  norms  specifically,  though  its  manifestation  as  hate  crimes  of  the  State.   
  
Conclusion  
This  research  sought  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  the  United  States’  approach  
to  balancing  the  interests  between  the  liberty  of  individual  expression  and  the  oppression  of  
minorities  through  civilian  hate  crimes.  I  theorized  that  hegemonic  ideology  has  a  more  
influential  and  violent  manifestation  in  society  when  speech  is  legally  restricted  because  a  
government  is  most  likely  to  restrict  speech  opposing  the  dominant  ideology.  To  investigate  this  
puzzle,  I  assessed  and  scored  the  relative  liberalism  of  50  U.S.  Supreme  Court  freedom  of  
expression  case  rulings  throughout  the  past  century.  During  this  same  time  period,  I  collected  as  
much  data  as  feasible  within  the  practical  limitations  of  this  project  to  chart  the  number  of  
reported  hate  crimes  from  1918  to  2018.  
The  Supreme  Court  rulings  showed  a  clear  trend  of  liberalization  in  the  rulings,  while  the  
number  of  reported  hate  crimes  over  the  same  century  increased  dramatically—contradicting  my  
hypothesis  that  the  liberalization  of  legal  free  speech  would  be  associated  with  a  decrease  in  hate  
crime  victimization.  While  my  findings  are  unable  to  support  my  hypothesis,  based  on  the  
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significant  lack  of  hate  crime  data  recorded  before  1970  and  the  nature  of  the  scarce  data  
acquired  from  1919  to  that  point,  I  argue  that  the  relatively  minuscule  record  of  hate  crimes  
recorded  during  this  time  period  is  not  a  result  of  the  actual  rate  of  victimization,  but  reflects  
society’s  normalization  of  and  desensitization  to  violence  against  minorities.  Given  my  research  
design  and  methodological  approach,  these  findings  are  not  necessarily  generalizable  to  other 
countries  with  different  histories  and  levels  of  diversity,  immigration,  and  systemic  inequality.  To  
account  for  this,  future  research  could  investigate  the  effects  of  speech  laws  on  more  
homogeneous  countries  and  countries  presently  employing  harsh  speech  restriction.  Given  
government’s  demonstrated  tendency  to  more  arbitrarily  restrict  speech  via  the  dominant  
ideology’s  values,  hate  speech  laws  may  result  in  serious  infringements  upon  minority  rights.  
This  research  implies  the  State  has  a  critical  role  in  maintaining  hegemony  in  society.  The  
United  States’  progression  from  intolerance  in  legal  rulings  parallels  an  increased  cultural  
legitimacy  granted  to  minorities’  voices  and  experiences.  When  government  suppression  of  
expression  it  deems  impermissible  by  hypothetical  and  improbable  reasoning  is  within  societal  
norms,  government  too  frequently  rules  in  alliance  with  Mill’s  tyranny  of  the  majority.  To  use  an  
analogy,  when  the  light  of  communication  is  always  filtered  through  a  red  lens,  it  can  be  difficult  
to  see  and  understand  green.  Stifled  communication  likely  promotes  a  more  hospitable  
environment  for  prejudice  attitudes,  whether  that  be  in  the  form  of  legally  and  socially  enforced  
hegemony--or  in  technological  advancements.  It  is  difficult  to  untangle  the  United  States’  
progression  of  tolerant  attitudes  with  the  progression  of  technological  advancement.  Technology  
has  facilitated  national  and  global  communication,  contributing  to  the  ability  to  share  ideas  and  
stories  across  expansive  spatial  divides.  But  today  brings  us  new  challenges  as  technology  
becomes  the  source  of  its  own  rapidly  changing  cultures,  complete  with  dark  corners  which  
welcome  prejudice  itself.  Is  digital  liberty  somehow  different  than  non-digital  liberty?  And  what  
of  the  increasing  role  of  private  companies  in  moderating  digital  speech?  Much  is  left  to  address.   
Given  the  volatile  nature  of  politics  in  a  technologically  advanced  age,  future  research  
ought  to  investigate  the  rhetoric  of  the  cultural  and  political  landscapes,  and  their  relationship  to  
minority  oppression.  Additionally,  it  is  also  important  for  scholars  to  investigate  the  impact  of  
government  implemented  human  rights  violations  on  the  free-flow  of  speech  in  society.  This  line  
of  research  would  likely  reveal  some  necessary  but  depressing  realities  about  the  intersection  of  
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Appendix  B 
Free  Speech  Index  
If  speech  is  punished  or  prohibited…  
1. Is  the  idea  contained  in  the  speech  unpopular  or  disliked  by  the  government?  (Yes  -10%)  
(To  some  -5%)  (No,  unstated  or  unclear  0%)  
2. Is  the  asserted  harm  of  the  speech…  (Unlikely?  -15%)  (Possible?  -10%)  (Present  and  
petty  -5%)  (Present  and  significant  -2%)  
3. Is  there  a  legitimate,  substantial,  immediate  danger  presented  by  permitting  the  speech?  
(No  -10%)  (Maybe  -5%)  (Yes  0%)  
4. Are  there  other  routes  for  communicating  this  message?  (No  obvious  alternatives  -10%)  
(Less  effective,  accessible,  or  compromised  alternatives  -5%)  (Bountiful  alternatives  
+5%)  
5. Is  the  speech  restricted  despite  there  being  no  infringement  on  the  liberties  or  rights  of  
another?  (Yes  -15%)  (Unclear  0%)  (Someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  at  risk  +3%)  
(No,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  +5%)  (No,  someone  else’s  
liberties  or  rights  were  severely  infringed  upon  +10%)  
6. Does  the  ruling  clearly  risk  having  a  chilling  effect  on  the  breadth  of  future  speech?  (Yes  
-10%)  (Maybe  or  to  a  slight  degree  0%)  (No  +10%)  
7. Is  the  speech  political  or  politicized?  (Yes  -10%)  (Indirectly  -5%)  (No  0%)  
8. Does  the  ruling  not  consider  an  act  of  “pure  speech”  (traditionally  written  or  verbal)  and  
criminalize  a  particular  act  of  symbolic  speech  that  was  intended  as  expression  from  
protection?  (Yes  -10%)  (Potentially  -5%)  (No  or  N/A  0%)  
9. Does  the  ruling  involve  obscenity  or  similar  categories  and  restrict  what  types  of  content  
or  information  available  to  consenting  adults?  (Yes  -10%)  (Somewhat,  but  there  is  other  
similar  content  available  -5%)  (No  or  N/A  0%)  
If  speech  is  permitted…  
10. Are  there  other  speech  restrictions  in  the  ruling  such  as  hypotheticals  or  alluded  
judgement  on  related  issues  that  may  have  a  chilling  effect  on  future  speech  or  
expression?  (Yes,  greatly  -15%)  (Yes  -10%)  (Yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well-defined,  and  




Appendix  C  
Case  Analyses 
  
1. Schenck  v.  US  (1919)  
  
FACTS:  Schenck  produced  mailing  pamphlets  encouraging  people  to  resist  the  draft  during  war  
with  Germany  during  WWI.  He  was  charged  with  three  charges:  a  conspiracy  to  cause  
insubordination  and  obstruct  military  recruitment  during  war  time,  a  conspiracy  to  use  USPS  for  
a  legally  nonmailable  document,  and  actually  unlawfully  using  the  mail  to  transmit  the  
pamphlets.  All  courts  found  the  defendants  guilty.   
  
Ruling:  By  the  Sedition  Act,  citizens  do  not  have  a  right  to  advocate  against  the  government  
during  times  of  war  with  the  intent  to  generate  insubordination  and  obstruct  military  recruitment.  
The  government  can  interfere  potentially  dangerous  speech  before  it  has  an  opportunity  to  
become  effective.  A  person  is  liable  for  the  intended  effect  of  speech  independent  of  if  the  actual  
obstruction  took  place.   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  
5-unclear  (0%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  40%  
  
2. Abrams  v.  US  (1919)  
  
FACTS:  During  WWI,  the  USSR  and  Germany  signed  a  peace  treaty  which  prompted  the  US  to  
send  troops  into  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  intent  to  “crush  the  Russian  Revolution.”  A  small  
group  of  Russian  Immigrants  produced  two  leaflets,  one  English,  one  Yiddish,  which  they  
distributed  in  and  around  NYC  encouraging  workers  to  go  on  a  general  strike  to  stop  producing  
the  ammunition  which  was  being  sent  to  US  troops  in  Russia.  The  US  government  prosecuted  
them  under  the  Sedition  Act  under  the  claim  that  their  leaflets  would  compromise  the  possibility  
of  US  victory  in  the  war  against  Germany.  The  trial  court  sentenced  them  to  20  years  in  prison.  
  
Ruling:  By  the  Sedition  Act,  citizens  cannot  produce  and  distribute  publications  protesting  the 
government’s  actions  during  wartime  if  the  government  perceives  it  to  have  the  potential  to  
interfere  with  the  production  of  necessary  resources  essential  to  war.  The  Court  determined  the  
defendants  had  the  intent  to  excite  civil  unrest  during  wartime  for  the  purpose  of  embarrassing  
and  potentially  defeating  military  plans.  
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-Unlikely  (-15%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  5-yes  




3. Gitlow  v.  NY  (1925)  
  
FACTS:  Gitlow  produced  and  distributed  “The  Left-Wing  Manifesto”  and  published  and  
distributed  the  writings  of  that  manifesto  in  a  paper  called  “The  Revolutionary  Age.”  While  the  
document  called  for  action  into  a  Communist  Revolution,  no  such  action  took  place.  Gitlow  was  
charged  with  the  statutory  crime  of  criminal  anarchy  according  to  the  New  York  Penal  Law.  
  
Ruling:  The  1st  Amendment  was  not  violated  by  Gitlow’s  conviction  under  the  New  York  Penal  
Law.  Unlike  previous  rulings,  the  Clear  and  Present  Danger  doctrine  does  not  apply  because  the  
State  has  a  right  to  self-preservation  against  intent  to  violently  and  unlawfully  overthrow  
organized  government.  “Utterances  advocating  the  overthrow  of  organized  government  by  force,  
violence  and  unlawful  means,  are  so  inimical  to  the  general  welfare  and  involve  such  danger  of  
substantive  evil  that  they  may  be  penalized  in  the  exercise  of  its  police  power.”   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-Unlikely  (-15%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  5-yes  
(-15%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  20%  
  
4. Whitney  v.  CA  (1927)  
  
FACTS:  Whitney  was  convicted  under  the  Criminal  Syndicalism  Act  of  California  for  organizing  
and  being  a  member  of  a  group  that  intended  to  effect  political  change  and  industrial  ownership  
or  control.  Whitney  argued  that  her  intention  in  being  a  part  of  the  Communist  Labor  Part  was  
not  to  promote  illegal  action  to  obtain  their  political  goals,  rather  she  had  spoken  out  in  favor  of  
action  via  lawful  measures.  The  defendant  claimed  the  Act  violated  her  1st  Amendment  rights  
via  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  14th  Amendment.   
  
Ruling:  Whitney’s  conviction  did  not  violate  the  free  speech  or  due  process.  “A  state  may  punish  
those  who  abuse  freedom  of  speech  by  utterances  inimical  to  the  public  welfare,  tending  to  incite  
crime,  disturb  the  public  peace,  or  endanger  the  foundations  of  organized  government  and  
threaten  to  overthrow  by  unlawful  means”  (Justice  Stanford).  Given  that  Whitney  had  joined  and  
furthered  the  existence  of  an  organization  which  sought  to  “menace  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the  
state,”  the  court  found  there  was  not  an  unreasonable  exercise  of  police  power.  
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-less  effective  or  compromised  
alternatives  (-5%),  5-unclear  (0%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  







5. Minersville  School  District  v.  Gobitis  (1940)  
  
FACTS:  Jehovah’s  Witnesses  attacked  public  school  regulations  requiring  students  to  salute  the  
flag  and  recite  the  pledge  of  allegiance.  They  alleged  it  went  against  their  religion.   
  
Ruling:  The  mandatory  flag  salute  did  not  infringe  upon  religious  and  speech  liberties  protected  
by  the  First  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.  National  unity  is  the  basis  of  national  security.  The  
state  has  a  right  to  select  the  appropriate  means  for  its  attainment  and  is  a  substantial  government  
interest  in  comparison  to  things  like  littered  streets.  The  court  declined  to  make  itself,  “the  school  
board  of  the  country.”  The  secular  regulation  rule  was  applied  which  holds  that  secular  
exceptions  cannot  be  granted  for  non-religious  government  actions  or  rules.  
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-Unlikely  (-15%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  (+5%),  5-yes  
(-15%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-yes  (-10%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  25%  
  
6. Chaplinsky  v.  NH  (1942)  
  
FACTS:  Chaplinsky,  a  Jehovah’s  Witness,  generated  disturbance  on  the  street  of  a  “restless”  
crowd  by  denouncing  all  religion  as  “racket.”  He  was  taken  aside  by  a  police  officer  and  the  two  
of  them  encountered  the  City  Marshal,  who  Chaplinsky  then  called  a  “God  damned  racketeer,”  
“a  damned  Fascist,”  and  proclaimed  that  “the  whole  government  of  Rochester  are  Fascists  or  
agents  of  Fascists.”  This  violated  a  New  Hampshire  state  law  that  no  person  “shall  address  any  
offensive  derisive  or  annoying  word  to  any  other  person  who  is  lawfully  in  any  street  or  other  
public  place,  nor  call  him  by  any  offensive  or  derisive  name.”   
  
Ruling:  The  New  hampshire  law  did  not  violate  freedom  of  speech.  Offensive  speech  that  is  
likely  to  provoke  violence  or  cause  a  breach  of  peace  is  not  protected.  Such  speech  is  categorized  
as  “fighting  words,”  which  are  face-to-face  words  plainy  likely  to  “men  of  common  
intelligence...to  cause  an  average  addressee  to  fight.”  Such  speech  is  not  an  “essential  part  of  any  
exposition  of  ideas”  and  does  not  have  a  “social  value”  such  as  a  “step  to  truth”  which  outweighs  
the  “social  interest  in  order  and  morality.”   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-maybe  (-5%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  
(+5%),  5-yes  (-15%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).   
Score:  50%  
  
7. NAACP  v.  AL  (1958)  
  
FACTS:  Alabama  sought  to  prevent  the  NAACP  from  doing  business  in  the  state.  After  the  
circuit  court  issued  a  restraining  order,  the  state  issued  a  subpoena  for  various  records  which  
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included  demanding  the  NAACP  reveal  the  names  and  addresses  of  all  of  its  Alabama  members  
and  agents.  The  NAACP  refused  on  the  grounds  that  the  state  cannot  constitutionally  compel  
disclosure.   
  
Ruling:  Alabama’s  requirement  for  the  advocacy  group  NAACP  to  disclose  the  names  and  
addresses  of  its  members  was  in  violation  of  the  1st  Amendment  freedom  of  speech  and  
assembly  and  in  violation  of  the  14th  Amendment  right  to  due  process.  Maintaining  member  
confidentiality  is  so  related  to  the  freedom  of  assembly  that  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  immunity  
from  state  scrutiny  when  conducting  lawful  activity.  Freedom  to  assemble  in  groups  dedicated  to  
advancing  a  belief  or  ideology  is  inseparable  from  the  due  process  clause.  Disclosing  the  
membership  of  the  NAACP  would  likely  result  in  an  interference  with  the  freedom  of  
association,  therefore  the  states  interest  in  maintaining  the  records  is  not  sufficient  to  supersede  
the  group  members  constitutional  rights.  Freedom  to  associate  with  organizations  that  advance  
beliefs  and  ideas  is  inseparable  from  the  14th  Amendment  Due  Process  Clause.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
8. Dennis  v.  US  (1951)  
  
FACTS:  During  the  McCarthy  Era,  several  petitioners  were  convicted  in  trial  by  jury  for  
violating  the  conspiracy  provisions  of  the  Smith  Act  of  1940  for  having  a  conspiracy  to 
overthrow  the  government  by  willingly  organizing  as  a  group  to  advocate  and  teach  violent  
government  overthrow.  The  defendants  were  teaching  four  books  which  “advocated  the  
overthrow  of  our  Government  by  force  and  violence.”  The  defendants  claimed  their  1st  
Amendment  rights  of  free  speech  and  assembly  were  violated  by  the  Smith  Act.  
  
Ruling:  Vinson  wrote  the  opinion  of  the  court  by  arguing  that  in  the  Clear  and  Probable  Danger  
doctrine ,  conspiring  and  teaching  for  the  violent  overthrow  of  government  during  the  time  of  the  
Cold  War  serves  as  an  imminent  danger.  He  argued  that  the  government  is  not  forced  to  wait  
until  the  moment  when  the  call  to  action  to  overthrow  is  made  to  prosecute,  as  that  would  not  be  
practical.  The  existence  of  the  conspiracy  to  organize  for  violent  government  overthrow  is  a  
danger  to  the  continuance  of  organized  government.  
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-Unlikely  (-15%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  
5-unclear  (0%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  35%  
  
9. Feiner  v.  NY  (1951)  
  
FACTS:  Feiner  gave  a  speech  on  a  street  corner  stating  that  Black  Americans  do  not  have  equal  
rights  and  “should  rise  up  in  arms  and  fight  for  them.”  The  crowd  was  bi-racial  and  gathered  
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75-80  people;  it  was  spilling  out  into  the  street  and  the  speech  “stirred  up  a  little  excitement,”  
and  “some  pushing,  shoving,  and  milling  around.”  After  about  20  minutes,  an  audience  member  
said  “If  you  don’t  get  that  son  of  a  bitch  off,  I  will  go  over  and  get  him  off  there  myself”  to  an  
observing  police  officer.  The  police  officer  requested  Feiner  stop  speaking  twice,  Feiner  ignored  
the  officer,  and  then  the  officer  arrested  Feiner.  The  report  gave  a  disorderly  conduct  charge  for  
“ignoring  and  refusing  to  heed  and  obey  reasonable  police  orders  issued  to  regulate  and  control  
said  crowd  and  to  prevent  a  breach  of  the  peace  and  to  prevent  injuries  to  pedestrians  attempting  
to  use  said  walk.”  
  
Ruling:  Feiner’s  arrest  for  giving  a  speech  which  riled  a  crowd  and  could  have  produced  a  breach  
of  the  peace  was  not  in  violation  of  his  1st  Amendment  rights.  The  arrest  was  reasonable  because  
the  police  officer  was  nervous  of  the  possibility  of  riot.  The  arrest  was  not  because  of  the  content  
of  the  speech,  but  rather  to  preserve  peace  given  the  audience’s  response.  He  says  a  police  officer  
using  arrest  as  an  instrument  to  silence  unpopular  views  is  different  from  situations  in  which  “the  
speaker  passes  the  bounds  of  argument  or  persuasion  and  undertakes  incitement  to  riot.”  The  
defense  was  ruled  valid  due  to  (1)  “the  imminence  of  greater  disorder  and  (2)  “the  deliberate  
defiance  of  the  police  officers.” 7   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%) 8 ,  4-less  effective  or  compromised  
alternatives  (-5%),  5-yes  (-15%) 9 ,  6-maybe  (0%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  
(0%).  Score:  40%  
  
10. Roth  v.  US  (1957)  
  
FACTS:  Roth  was  convicted  under  a  federal  obscenity  law  for  mailing  obscene  advertising  and  
an  obscene  book.   
  
Ruling:  The  federal  obscenity  law  prohibiting  the  sale  or  transfer  of  obscenity  through  the  mail  
did  not  violate  the  1st  Amendment  freedom  of  expression.  Obscene  material  is  not  protected  by  
the  1st  Amendment  as  it  does  not  have  redeeming  social  importance.  Sex,  being  a  great  motive  
force  in  human  life  is  a  matter  of  human  interest  and  public  concern.  Obscenity  on  the  other  hand  
may  “perceptibly  create  a  clear  and  present  danger  of  antisocial  conduct,  or  will  probably  induce  
its  recipients  to  such  conduct  (although  the  Court  admits  no  evidence  to  support  this  claim  is  
7  Justice  Black’s  dissent  in  this  case  argued  that  the  evidence  presented  would  not  suggest  there  was  an  imminent  
danger  of  riot.  The  police  officer’s  actions  were  contrary  to  ordinary  official  duty  to  protect  Feiner's  constitutional  
right  to  speak.  The  police  officer  could  have  protected  Feiner’s  right  to  speak  and  maintained  social  order  and  safety  
by  making  an  aisle  in  the  sidewalk  to  keep  pedestrians  out  of  the  street  and  spoken  to  or  arrested  the  person  
threatening  the  speaker.  Finally,  he  disagrees  that  “deliberate  defiance”  to  head  to  a  police  officer’s  unexplained  
request  is  warrant  for  arrest  or  customary  practice.  
8  The  evidence  presented  to  the  Court  would  not  suggest  there  was  an  imminent  danger  of  riot.  




provided  in  this  case).  Therefore,  the  “protection  of  freedom  of  speech  and  press  for  material  
which  does  not  treat  sex  in  a  manner  appealing  to  prurient  interest”  is  safeguarded  from  the  
censorship  of  obscenity.  The  present  test  is  “whether  to  the  average  person,  applying  
contemporary  community  standards,  the  dominant  theme  of  the  material  taken  as  a  whole,  
appeals  to  prurient  interest”  and  is  utterly  without  redeeming  social  importance.  The  trial  courts  
sufficiently  followed  this  standard  and  the  laws  did  not  fail  to  give  adequate  notice  of  what  is 
prohibited.  
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%) 10 ,  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%) 11 ,  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  
5-no,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  (+5%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-no  (0%),  
8-potentially  (-5%),  9-yes  (-10%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  40%  
  
11. Edwards  v.  South  Carolina  (1963)  
  
FACTS:  187  Black  student  protesters  were  marching  along  the  South  Carolina  State  House  
grounds  holding  signs  that  messaged  “Down  with  Segregation.”  A  large  crowd  gathered,  and  
authorities  ordered  the  protesters  to  disperse  within  15  minutes.  When  they  did  not,  they  were  
arrested.   
  
Ruling:  The  protesters’  arrests  were  in  violation  of  their  1st  Amendment  rights  to  assembly,  to  
the  petition  of  grievances,  and  free  speech  along  with  their  14th  Amendment  due  process  rights.  
There  was  no  reason  to  restrain  the  protesters  given  no  violence  was  present  or  being  threatened  
by  the  onlookers  or  the  protestors.  The  1st  and  14th  Amendment  do  not  permit  a  State  to  
criminalize  the  peaceful  expression  of  unpopular  views.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes  (-10%) 12 .  Score:  90%  
  
12. Adderly  v.  FL  (1966)  
  
FACTS:  A  group  of  32  students  protested  the  arrest  of  other  students  the  day  before  and  to  
demonstrate  against  racial  segregation  outside  of  a  county  jail  on  the  jail’s  premises.  They  were  
at  the  jail  entrance  to  begin  and  the  county  sheriff  asked  them  to  leave.  They  did  not,  but  they  did  
10  Note  the  1950s  conservative  mainstream  attitude  towards  sexuality  and  the  way  the  Court  deems  obscene  material  
to  be  lacking  in  redeeming  social  importance.  Note  the  definition  of  “prurient”  from  Webster’s  New  International  
Dictionary  in  1949:  “Itching;  longing;  uneasy  with  desire  or  longing  of  persons,  having  itching,  morbid,  or  
lascivious  longings;  of  desire,  curiosity  or  propensity,  lewd.”  
11  Kutchinsky,  B.  (1973).  The  effect  of  easy  availability  of  pornography  on  the  incidence  of  sex  crimes:  The  Danish  
experience.  Journal  of  Social  Issues ,  29(3),  163–181.  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1973.tb00094.x  
This  study  uses  the  Danish  liberalization  of  pornography  laws  as  a  case  study  and  finds  “concurrent  with  the  
increasing  availability  of  pornography,  there  was  a  significant  decrease  in  the  number  of  sex  offenses  registered  by  
the  police  in  Copenhagen.”  
12  The  holding  implies  non-peaceful  protestors  may  be  punished.  
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move  back  from  the  jail  entrance  and  remained  in  the  driveway.  They  were  convicted  for  
“trespass  with  a  malicious  and  mischievous  intent.”   
  
Ruling:  The  students’  First  Amendment  Rights  to  petition  the  redress  of  grievances  were  not  
violated  by  arresting  and  prosecuting  them  for  trespassing  onto  the  grounds  of  a  county  jail  and  
not  leaving  when  asked.  The  record  showed  that  the  sheriff  did  not  object  to  their  cause,  only  to  
their  presence  on  the  ground  that  “jail  grounds  are  reserved  for  jail  uses.”  Given  that  no  such  
protest  had  happened  before,  it  could  conclude  that  the  enforcement  was  evenhanded.  Nothing  in  
the  Constitution  would  prohibit  the  even  handed  enforcement  against  trespassing  which  
amounted  to  the  curtilage  of  the  jailhouse.  The  State  has  similar  rights  to  property  as  a  private  
owner  would  when  it  comes  to  trespassing  and  “has  the  power  to  preserve  the  property  under  its  
control  for  the  use  to  which  it  is  lawfully  dedicated.”   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-less  effective  or  compromised  
alternatives  (-5%),  5-yes  (-15%),  6-maybe  or  to  a  slight  degree  (0%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  
9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  40%  
  
13. Brandenburg  v.  OH  (1969)  
  
FACTS:  During  a  TV  broadcasted  KKK  rally  where  some  members  were  holding  weapons,  one  
KKK  member  gave  a  speech  saying  revenge  on  U.S.  government  might  be  possible  if  white  
suppression  does  not  cease,  and  the  KKK  may  march  on  Congress  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  and  
then  march  into  St.  Augustine  and  Mississippi.  Brandenburg  was  prosecuted  under  the  Ohio  
Criminal  Syndicalism  statute  for  “advocating  the  duty,  necessity,  or  propriety  of  crime,  sabotage,  
violence,  or  unlawful  means  of  terrorism  as  a  means  of  accomplishing  industrial  or  political  
reform”  and  “voluntarily  assembling  with  any  society,  group,  or  assemblage  of  persons  formed  
to  teach  or  advocate  the  doctrines  of  criminal  syndicalism.”  He  was  charged  with  $1,000  fine  and  
10  years  in  prison.   
  
Ruling:  The  statute  violated  rights  to  free  speech  and  assembly.  The  court  ruled  that  the  
Government  constitutionally  cannot  forbid  or  suppress  speech  unless  it  is  “directed  to  inciting  or  
producing  imminent  lawless  action”  and  is  actually  “likely  to  incite  or  produce  such  action.”  By  
this  measure,  the  Ohio  Criminal  Syndicalism  statute  is  overly  broad  in  that  it  does  not  distinguish  
between  advocacy  and  criminal  action.  
  







14. Tinker  v.  Des  Moines  School  District  (1969)  
  
FACTS:  Two  students  wore  black  armbands  protesting  the  Vietnam  War  and  they  were  asked  to  
remove  their  armbands  but  refused.  The  students  were  suspended  until  they  were  ready  to  return  
without  the  armbands.   
  
Ruling:  The  school’s  prohibition  of  black  armbands  in  political  protest  of  the  Vietnam  War  was  
in  violation  of  the  students’  1st  Amendment  rights  to  free  speech  and  expression.  The  students’  
symbolic  speech  represents  “pure  speech”  rather  than  conduct.  The  armband  prohibition  was  
viewpoint  discrimination  given  that  it  was  the  only  type  of  symbolic  speech  which  had  been  
singled  out  for  prohibition.  There  was  no  evidence  that  authorities  had  reason  to  anticipate  the  
wearing  of  armbands  would  substantially  interfere  with  the  work  of  the  school  or  impinge  upon  
the  rights  of  other  students.  A  student  may  express  their  opinions  if  they  do  so  in  a  way  that  is  
undisruptive  in  the  school  environment.  Symbolic  political  speech  is  permitted  by  students  in  a  
school  environment  so  long  as  it  does  not  materially  or  substantially  interfere.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes  (-10%) 13 .  Score:  90%  
  
15. Lloyd  Corporations  v.  Tanner  (1972)  
  
FACTS:  Donald  Tanner,  a  Vietnam  War  protestor  was  distributing  anti-war  handbills  inside  the  
Lloyd  Center  Mall  in  Portland,  Oregon.  The  Lloyd  Center  Mall  was  a  privately-owned  business  
intended  for  public  use  which  did  not  allow  for  the  distribution  of  handbills  inside  the  mall  and  
the  handbills  did  not  have  content  related  to  the  Mall.  While  Tanner  and  company  were  
distributing  handbills,  mall  security  informed  them  they  were  to  stop  their  distribution  or  be  
arrested.  They  stopped  their  distribution  and  filed  suit  against  Lloyd  Corporation  accusing  
violation  to  their  First  Amendment  right  to  free  speech.   
  
Ruling:  Lloyd  Corporation  did  not  violate  Tanner’s  (&  co.’s)  First  Amendment  right  to  free  
speech  when  they  refused  to  allow  the  distribution  of  handbills  inside  their  privately-owned  
shopping  mall.  This  case  differs  from  the  Amalgamated  Food  Employees  v.  Logan  Valley  Plaza  
Inc.  case  where  the  location  was  relevant  to  the  protestors’  point.  In  this  case,  the  content  of  the  
handbills  did  not  directly  relate  to  the  shopping  mall,  nor  was  inside  the  shopping  mall  the  only  
reasonable  opportunity  to  carry  out  their  intentions.  The  First  Amendment  is  not  guaranteed  
within  privately-owned  shopping  centers  if  the  content  of  the  message  is  irrelevant  to  the  
operation  of  the  shopping  center.   
  
13  Later  rulings  restricted  student  speech  on  the  notion  that  students  could  become  distracted  from  their  learning  
material.  The  Tinker  ruling  also  did  not  clearly  expand  all  First  Amendment  rights  to  students  which  was  used  to  
suppress  student  speech  later  on  by  permitting  school  administrators  to  be  the  arbiters  of  what  expression  and  
academic  inquiry  is  appropriate  for  the  classroom  and  curriculum.  
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INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  (+5%),  5-no,  
someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  (+5%),  6-no  (+10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  
(0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  80%  
  
16. Lehman  v.  Shaker  Heights  (1974)  
  
FACTS:  Lehman  was  a  political  candidate  running  for  the  Ohio  House  of  Representatives  in  a  
district  which  included  the  city  of  Shaker  Heights.  Shaker  Heights  allowed  commercial  
advertising  on  their  city  busses  but  had  a  rule  against  political  advertising  on  city-owned  busses.  
Lehman  challenged  that  rule  when  he  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  buy  space  for  campaign  
advertisements,  claiming  the  rule  violated  the  First  Amendment  freedom  of  speech  clause.   
  
Ruling:  The  Shaker  Heights  city  rule  barring  political  advertising  on  city-owned  busses  did  not  
violate  the  1st  Amendment.  A  city  transit  system  has  a  right  to  make  reasonable  choices  about  
the  type  of  advertising  allowed  on  city  busses.  Favoring  long-term  advertising  would  be  more  
profitable  to  the  city  than  short-term  candidacy  or  issue-oriented  advertisements.  To  allow  for  
such  advertisement  would  subject  city  bus  users  to  “the  blare  of  political  propaganda”  as  a  
captive  audience.  Public  transportation  is  not  a  public  forum.  
  
INDEX:  1-unstated  (0%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  
(+5%),  5-unclear  (0%) 14 ,  6-no  (+10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).   
Score:  90%  
  
17. Erznoznik  v.  Jacksonville  (1975)  
  
FACTS:  A  film  was  shown  in  a  drive-in  theater  which  showed  non-obscene  nudity.  The  nudity  
was  visible  from  the  public  street,  so  the  theater  was  charged  with  violating  a  city  ordinance  
which  prohibited  showing  films  which  contained  nudity  visible  from  a  public  area.   
  
Ruling:  The  Jacksonville  ordinance  restricting  nudity  on  film  visible  from  a  public  space  is  in  
violation  of  the  1st  Amendment.  So  long  as  the  unwilling  viewer  has  opportunity  to  look  away,  
the  burden  falls  onto  them  to  do  so,  but  the  state  cannot  restrict  otherwise  protected  speech  for  
the  sake  of  the  predicted  offended  viewer.  Furthermore,  film  which  portrays  non-obscene  nudity  
cannot  be  limited  broadly  for  the  fact  of  nudity.  Finally,  to  the  argument  that  nudity  visible  to  
public  roads  would  distract  motorists,  the  Court  argued  “fleeting  and  innocent  glimpses  of  
nudity,”  would  not  be  more  dangerous  content  portrayed  on  the  screen  such  as  violence.  The  
14  Does  the  local  government’s  right  to  make  money  suffice  as  a  person  having  their  rights  violated?  Do  people  
really  have  a  right  to  not  be  a  member  of  a  captive  audience  to  a  political  message  on  public  transportation?  How  
might  this  have  been  different  if  the  political  message  was  communicated  by  bus  passengers  rather  than  a  passive  
advertisement?   
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Government  cannot  decide  which  otherwise  protected  speech  is  so  offensive  it  must  be  
prohibited.  Speech  cannot  be  prohibited  merely  because  it  offends.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a,  10-yes  (-10%).  Score:  90%  
  
18. Southeastern  Promotion,  Ltd.  v.  Conrad  (1975)  
  
FACTS:  The  municipal  board  managing  city  theaters  in  Chattanooga  did  not  want  to  show  the  
musical  “Hair.”  They  refused  on  the  grounds  that  the  production  would  not  be  “in  the  best  
interest  of  the  community.”  When  the  Supreme  Court  addressed  the  case,  they  did  not  get  to  the  
alleged  obscenity  of  the  case  that  had  been  a  major  issue  in  the  lower  courts.   
  
Ruling:  The  municipal  board’s  refusal  to  permit  the  showing  of  the  musical  “Hair”  was  in  
violation  of  the  1st  Amendment  due  to  prior  restraint  imposed  without  sufficient  procedural  
safeguards.  Municipal  theaters  are  “public  forums  designed  for  and  dedicated  to  expressive  
activities.”  There  was  no  appropriate  application  of  time,  place,  or  manner  restrictions  related  to  
the  nature  of  the  facility.  No  rights  of  others  would  be  violated  by  the  production  and  no  
unconsenting  captive  audience  existed.  It  does  not  matter  if  the  petitioner  could  have  used  a  
privately-owned  theater  in  the  city,  they  had  a  right  to  the  municipal  theater:  “that  alone  would  
not  justify  an  otherwise  impermissible  prior  restraint.”  
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a,  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
19. Young  v.  American  Mini  Theaters  (1976)  
  
FACTS:  American  Mini  Theaters  opened  two  adult  theaters  and  bookstores.  A  Detroit  ordinance  
required  that  “adult”  theaters  not  be  within  1,000  feet  of  any  two  other  “regulated  uses”  (such  as  
bars,  billiard  halls,  hotels  and  cabarets)  or  within  500  feet  of  a  residential  area.  An  “adult”  
establishment  was  a  theater  that  presented  “material  distinguished  or  characterized  by  emphasis  
on  matters  depicting,  describing  or  relating  to  ‘specified  sexual  activities’  or  ‘specified  
anatomical  areas.’”  The  theaters  were  challenged  by  the  ordinance  because  they  were  located  
within  1,000  feet  of  two  other  “regulated  uses.”  American  Mini  Theaters  sued  the  city  on  the  
grounds  that  the  ordinance  put  undue  burden  on  First  Amendment  rights  of  speech,  expression  
and  press  and  violated  the  14th  Amendment’s  Equal  Protection  Clause.  The  city  argued  the  
zoning  law  was  necessary  because  the  adult  theaters  near  several  “regulated  uses”  tended  to  
attract  “undesirable  transients,  adversely  affected  property  values,  and  caused  an  increase  in  
crime.”   
  
Ruling:  The  Detroit  ordinances  did  not  violate  the  14th  or  1st  Amendment.  While  speech  should  
be  protected  by  the  furthest  extent  possible,  obscene  speech  is  not  fully  protected  by  the  1st  
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Amendment,  but  it  is  still  protected  from  full  suppression.  The  city’s  interest  in  preserving  the  
character  of  its  neighborhoods  adequately  supported  the  classification  of  sexual  films  to  location  
restrictions  in  order  to  allow  the  city  a  “reasonable  opportunity  to  experiment  with  solutions  to  
admittedly  serious  problems.”  Government  may  use  content  in  furthering  a  substantial  
government  interest  in  enforcing  place  restriction.  
  
INDEX:  1-to  some  (-5%),  2-possible  (-10%) 15 ,  3-no  (-10%),  4-less  effective  or  compromised  
alternatives  (-5%),  5-yes  (-15%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-no  (0%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-yes  (-10%),  10-n/a 
(0%).  Score:  35%  
  
20. Hudgens  v.  NLRB  (1976)  
  
FACTS:  Labor  picketing  took  place  inside  a  private  shopping  center.  Picketers  were  employees  
of  a  warehouse  maintained  by  a  store  owner  at  the  private  shopping  center  and  were  on  strike.   
  
Ruling:  The  First  Amendment  freedom  of  speech,  redress  of  grievances,  assembly,  and  
expression  does  not  protect  labor  picketing  inside  a  private  shopping  center  about  a  matter  that  
relates  to  the  operation  of  the  shopping  center.  If  the  respondent  in  the  Lloyd  case  did  not  have  
the  First  Amendment  right  to  distribute  handbills  concerning  Vietnam,  then  the  respondent  in  
this  case  does  not  have  the  right  to  advertise  their  strike  in  the  shopping  center.  The  First  
Amendment  is  not  guaranteed  within  privately-owned  shopping  centers,  even  if  the  content  of  
the  speech  concerns  the  operation  of  the  shopping  center.   
  
INDEX:  1-unstated  (0%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-less  effective  or  
compromised  alternatives  (-5%),  5-no,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  
(+5%),  6-maybe  (0%),  7-indirectly  (-5%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  80%  
  
21. Collin  v.  Smith  (1978)  
  
FACTS:  The  National  Socialist  Party  of  America  (NSPA)  wanted  to  have  a  rally  advocating  for  
White  Rights  in  Skokie,  Illinois,  a  town  with  a  high  Jewish  population.  In  response,  Skokie  
enacted  three  ordinances  for  public  demonstrations.  (1)  demonstrators  must  be  approved  for  a  
permit,  (2)  no  materials  within  Skokie  may  be  distributed  which  intentionally  “promote  and  
incited  hatred  against  persons  by  any  reason  of  their  race,  national  origin,  or  religion,”  and  (3)  no  
military-style  uniforms  may  be  worn  during  public  demonstrations.  The  NSPA  applied  for  a  
permit  for  a  30-50  participant  march  which  would  feature  wearing  uniforms  with  swastikas  and  
banners  with  statements  such  as  “White  Free  Speech,”  “Free  Speech  for  the  White  Man,”  and  
15  Seaman,  C.,  &  Linz,  D.  (2014).  Are  Adult  Businesses  Crime  Hotspots?  Comparing  Adult  Businesses  to  Other  




“Free  Speech  for  White  America.”  A  Jewish  ACLU  attorney  challenged  the  Skokie  ordinances  
on  the  bases  of  the  1st  Amendment.   
  
Ruling:  The  NSPA’s  planned  demonstration  was  protected  by  the  1st  Amendment;  the  enacted  
Skokie  ordinances  violated  the  1st  Amendment.  A  state  may  not  criminalize  the  peaceful  
expression  of  unpopular  views.  There  was  no  evidence  that  violence  would  occur  if  the  rally  
were  to  take  place.  Whether  an  idea  is  valid  or  not  is  not  for  the  courts  to  proclaim  and  restrict  
non-valid  ideas.  The  1st  Amendment  cannot  be  restricted  in  anticipation  of  mental  trauma.  
Speech  which  “invites  dispute''  cannot  be  criminalized.  While  the  town  argued  their  fair  housing  
policy  would  be  undercut  by  the  spread  of  racially  defamatory  material,  one  of  the  purposes  of  
the  rights  of  free  speech  is  that  government’s  policies  may  be  undercut  by  the  exercise  of  it.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a,  10- yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well  defined,  and  necessary  to  ensure  a  significant  
public  interest  (-5%) .  Score:  95%  
  
22. FCC  v.  Pacifica  Foundation  (1978)  
  
FACTS:  George  Carlin  had  a  twelve-minute  monologue  called  “Filthy  Words,”  where  Carlin  
gave  a  satire  on  “the  words  you  couldn’t  say  on  the  public,  uh,  airwaves,”  including  “shit,  piss,  
fuck,  cunt,  cocksucker,  motherfucker,  and  tits.”  The  program  was  played  during  the  
midafternoon  and  advised  listeners  immediately  before  starting  that  the  program  would  include,  
“sensitive  language  which  might  be  regarded  as  offensive  to  some.”  The  FCC  received  a  
complaint  from  a  man  who  said  he  heard  the  broadcast  when  he  was  driving  with  his  young  son.  
The  FCC  responded  by  issuing  a  Declaratory  Order  designed  to  channel  certain  words  depicting  
sexual  and  excretory  activity  “to  times  of  day  when  children  most  likely  would  not  be  exposed.”  
  
Ruling:  The  1st  Amendment  does  not  prohibit  the  FCC  from  restricting  the  broadcast  of  
offensive  language.  If  vulgar  words  are  used  in  the  context  of  political  content  or  have  some  
other  literary,  scientific,  or  social  value,  they  may  be  protected.  However,  the  context  of  this  
monologue  made  the  content  undisputedly  “vulgar,”  “offensive,”  and  “shocking.”  In  some 
contexts,  such  speech  is  protected.  In  the  context  of  public  radio  during  midafternoon  however,  it  
is  not.  It  violates  the  privacy  of  an  individual’s  home  because  people  are  constantly  tuning  in  and  
out  of  the  radio,  which  may  cause  them  to  miss  the  prior  warning  for  the  “unexpected  program  
content.”  Simply  turning  off  the  radio  upon  hearing  vulgar  language  does  not  protect  against  a  
harm  that  has  already  taken  place.  Furthermore,  the  media  of  radio  is  too  easily  accessible  to  
young  children  who  may  learn  curse  words  from  the  program.  We  are  not  captive  audiences  to  
speech  within  the  sanctuary  of  our  own  homes.   
  
INDEX:  1-to  some  (-5%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-less  effective  or  compromised  
alternatives  (-5%),  5-someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  at  risk  (+3%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-no  
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(0%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-somewhat,  but  there  is  other  similar  content  available  (-5%),  10-n/a  (0%).  
Score:  73%  
  
23. PruneYard  Shopping  Center  v.  Robins  (1980)  
  
FACTS:  Students  sought  to  solicit  signatures  for  a  petition  protesting  a  UN  resolution  against  
Zionism  in  a  privately-owned  shopping  center.  The  shopping  center  had  a  nondiscriminatory  
policy  of  barring  all  expressive  activity  not  directly  related  to  its  commercial  purposes.  The  
California  state  constitution  guarantees  speakers  who  are  “reasonably  exercising”  expressive  
rights  access  to  a  privately-owned  shopping  center,  even  though  the  Supreme  Court  had  rejected  
such  protection  as  a  matter  of  the  First  Amendment.   
  
Ruling:  State  constitutional  provisions  permitting  individuals  to  exercise  free  speech  and  petition  
on  the  property  of  a  privately-owned  shopping  center  open  to  the  public  do  not  violate  the  
shopping  center  owner’s  First  Amendment  right  not  to  be  forced  by  the  state  to  open  their  private  
property  as  a  public  forum.  The  views  expressed  by  the  pamphlets  were  not  likely  to  be  
associated  with  the  views  of  the  owner.  The  State  did  not  dictate  a  specific  message  to  be  
displayed  so  there  was  no  danger  of  government  content  discrimination  for  or  against  a  particular  
message.  If  PruneYard  wanted  to  expressly  disavow  connection  with  the  message,  they  could  
post  signs  in  the  area  where  the  speakers  or  handbillers  stood.  States  are  free  to  reasonably  
expand  individual  liberty.  The  California  constitution  makes  shopping  malls  within  the  state  
public  forums.  Individual  free  speech  rights  may  be  superior  to  the  rights  of  the  owner.  
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well-defined,  and  necessary  to  ensure  a  
significant  public  interest  (-5%).  Score:  95%  
  
24. Connick  v.  Myers  (1983)  
  
FACTS:  Myers  had  worked  as  an  Assistant  District  Attorney  for  over  five  years.  Her  boss,  
Connick  transferred  her  to  a  different  section  of  the  criminal  court  and  Myers  strongly  opposed  
the  transfer.  She  prepared  a  questionnaire  for  her  co-workers  asking  for  their  opinions  on  the  
transfer  policy,  office  moral,  confidence  in  supervisors,  and  if  they  felt  pressure  to  work  in  
political  campaigns  on  behalf  of  office  supported  candidates.  Upon  finding  out  about  the  
questionnaire,  Connick  immediately  fired  her  for  insubordination.  
  
Ruling:  Public  officials  do  not  have  a  right  to  distribute  questionnaires  regarding  internal  
operations  which  may  indirectly  impact  public  affairs  and  may  criticize  authorities  in  the  
workplace.  The  speech  of  public  employees  is  only  protected  when  it  explicitly  regards  matters  
of  public  concern.  Meyers’  speech  only  dealt  with  personal  and  internal  office  issues.  The  district  
court  placed  too  high  of  a  burden  on  Connick  to  show  that  Meyers’  speech  substantially  
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interfered  with  the  operation  of  the  office.  The  employer  reasonably  believed  Meyers’  speech  
would  reasonably  interfere  with  office  operations  by  undermining  the  authority  figures  in  the  
office.  A  balance  must  be  struck  between  the  interests  of  the  citizen  and  the  state.  
  
INDEX:  1-unstated  (0%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-maybe  (-5%),  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  
5-yes  (-15%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-indirectly  (-5%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).   
Score:  55%  
  
25. Members  of  City  Council  v.  Taxpayers  for  Vincent  (1984)  
  
FACTS:  A  Los  Angeles  Municipal  Code  prohibited  the  posting  of  signs  on  public  property.  The  
Taxpayers  for  Vincent  challenged  this  code  as  a  violation  to  their  First  Amendment  right  to  free  
speech  because  they  wanted  to  post  political  signs  for  a  local  election.   
  
Ruling:  The  Los  Angeles  Municipal  Code  prohibiting  the  posting  of  signs  on  public  property  
does  not  violate  the  1st  Amendment.  Total  bans  on  a  particular  mode  of  communication  are  
constitutional  so  long  as  they  satisfy  a  substantial  government  interest  and  restrict  speech  no  
greater  than  is  essential  to  achieve  that  objective.  An  interest  in  an  aesthetic  environment  is  a  
substantial  government  interest.  Given  that  the  ban  is  viewpoint  neutral,  the  ban  must  address  a  
substantial  government  interest  and  restrict  speech  no  greater  than  is  essential  to  achieve  that  
objective.  The  ban  is  a  reasonable  time,  place,  or  manner  restriction  and  is  narrowly  tailored  to 
serve  the  interest  of  eliminating  visual  clutter.  This  is  a  ban  on  the  exact  source  of  the  evil  it  
sought  to  remedy,  unlike  pamphleting  bans  which  punished  a  potential  littering  risk  of  the  
activity  by  recipients  of  the  leaflets.  The  public  ban  which  still  allows  for  posters  on  private  
property  is  understandable  because  private  citizens  have  the  right  to  control  their  own  property  
and  it  enables  more  routes  of  communication.  The  remaining  routes  of  communication  are  
adequate  (speech,  distributing  literature);  there  is  nothing  the  appellees  indicate  is  uniquely  
valuable  or  important  with  the  particular  mode  of  communication  banned.  Just  because  property  
is  public  does  not  mean  it  is  a  public  forum,  especially  since  it  is  not  demonstrated  to  be  a  
traditional  public  form;  the  government  has  a  right  to  reserve  public  property  for  its  intended  
purpose.  A  less  restrictive  ordinance  on  posters  may  not  be  constitutionally  permissible  because  
they  generate  a  risk  of  content  discrimination.   
  
INDEX:  1-unstated  (0%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-less  effective  or  
compromised  alternatives  (-5%),  5-yes  (-15%),  6-maybe  or  to  a  slight  degree  (0%),  7-yes  







26. Frisby  v.  Schultz  (1988)  
  
FACTS:  In  a  suburb  of  Milwaukee,  a  group  of  11-  40+  people  picketed  the  residence  of  a  doctor  
who  performed  abortions.  The  town  responded  by  enacting  a  flat  ban  on  all  residential  picketing,  
barring  picketing  “on  or  about  the  residence  of  any  individual.”  
  
Ruling:  A  flat  ban  on  all  residential  picketing  focused  on  an  individual’s  residence  is  not  in  
violation  of  the  First  Amendment  right  to  free  speech  and  assembly.  The  ordinance  was  narrowly  
tailored  to  serve  a  significant  government  interest  and  left  open  ample  alternative  channels  of  
communication.  E.g.  individuals  could  still  march  the  residential  streets,  proselytize  door  to  door,  
and  distribute  literature.  There  is  a  significant  government  interest  in  protecting  unwilling  
recipients  from  communications  within  the  sanctuary  of  their  own  homes.  Narrowly  tailored  
residential  picketing  bans  serving  a  significant  government  interest  of  protecting  captive  
audiences  are  constitutionally  allowable  so  long  as  other  reasonable  opportunities  for  
communication  are  available.  Focused  picketing  of  an  individual’s  home  is  not  protected  
expression  due  to  time,  place,  and  manner  restrictions.  
  
INDEX:  1-unstated  (0%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  
(+5%),  5-no,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  (+5%),  6-maybe  (0%),  7-yes  
(-10%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  85%  
  
27. TX  v.  Johnson  (1989)  
  
FACTS:  Johnson  publicly  burned  an  American  flag  as  a  means  of  political  protest  of  the  Reagan  
administration  outside  of  the  Dallas  City  Hall  where  the  Republican  National  Convention  was  
taking  place  in  Dallas.  Other  forms  of  vandalism  had  taken  place  at  the  protest,  but  not  by  
Johnson.  Johnson  was  handed  the  flag  which  had  been  taken  down  from  a  flagpole  outside  one  
of  the  targeted  buildings  and  burned  it.  While  the  flag  burned,  the  crowd  changed  “America,  the  
red,  the  white,  and  blue,  we  spit  on  you.”  After  the  demonstration,  a  witness  gathered  the  flag  
remains  and  buried  them  in  his  backyard.  Johnson,  the  only  individual  who  was  charged  with  a  
crime,  was  charged  with  the  desecration  of  a  venerated  object.  He  was  sentenced  to  one  year  in  
prison  and  fined  $2,000.   
  
Ruling:  The  application  of  the  Texas  statute  to  Johnson’s  symbolic  flag  burning  was  in  violation  
of  his  1st  Amendment  rights  of  expression.  Political  flag  burning  is  constitutionally  protected  
expression.  “The  expressive,  overtly  political  nature  of  this  conduct  was  both  intentional  and  
overwhelmingly  apparent  [and  thus  implicates]  the  First  Amendment.”  The  government  claimed  
interest  in  preventing  breaches  of  the  peace  and  “preserving  the  flag  as  a  symbol  of  nationhood  
and  national  unity.”  The  interest  in  maintaining  the  peace  is  moot  in  this  case  because  there  was  
no  indication  that  a  breach  to  the  peace  was  at  risk.  It  is  necessary  that  the  specific  context  in 
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which  an  expression  occurs  be  seriously  considered  and  not  allowable  to  assume  that  every  flag  
burning  possesses  the  potential  for  a  breach  of  the  peace.  The  government  interest  in  “preserving  
the  flag  as  a  symbol  of  nationhood  and  national  unity”  is  a  content-based  restriction  given  that  
ceremonial  burning  to  retire  a  flag  is  permitted  and  preferred.  “...The  Government  may  not  
prohibit  the  expression  of  an  idea  simply  because  society  finds  the  idea  itself  offensive  or  
disagreeable.”  The  state  may  not  allow  flag  burning  as  a  symbol  in  only  one  direction.  To  allow  
the  government  to  designate  “symbols  to  communicate  only  a  limited  set  of  messages  would  be  
to  enter  territory  having  no  discernible  or  defensible  boundaries.”  The  way  to  preserve  the  flag  as  
a  symbol  of  nationhood  and  national  unity  is  not  to  punish  those  who  feel  differently  about  these  
matters,  it  is  to  persuade  them  they  are  wrong.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
28. Barnes  v.  Glenn  Theater  (1991)  
  
FACTS:  The  Glen  Theatre  and  Kitty  Kat  Lounge  provided  totally  nude  dancing  as  entertainment.  
An  Indiana  Statute  required  dancers  wear  “pasties”  and  “G-strings”  in  public  spaces.  The  
respondents  argued  Indiana’s  prohibition  against  complete  nudity  was  a  violation  of  the  First  
Amendment  Freedom  of  Expression.   
  
Ruling:  The  Indiana  prohibition  against  complete  public  nudity  does  not  violate  the  1st  
Amendment’s  protection  of  expression.  There  is  a  substantial  government  interest  in  order  and  
morality  and  nude  dancing  in  this  form  is  not  constitutionally  protected  expressive  activity.  
Given  that  the  public  indecency  statute  furthered  a  substantial  government  interest  unrelated  to  
the  dancers’  messages,  the  limitation  on  the  expressive  activity  was  a  justified  incidental  
limitation.  Conduct  may  not  simply  be  labeled  as  expression  and  then  be  granted  1st  Amendment  
protections.   
  
INDEX:  1-to  some  (-5%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-maybe  (-5%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  
(+5%),  5-unclear  (0%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-no  (0%),  8-potentially  (-5%),  9-yes  (-10%),  10-n/a  (0%).  
Score:  65%  
  
29. Forsyth  County,  Georgia  v.  Nationalist  Movement  (1992)  
  
FACTS:  Forsyth  County  had  a  county  ordinance  which  required  demonstrators  pay  a  fee  of  up  to  
$1,000  to  pay  for  the  public  cost  of  law  enforcements  which  “exceeds  the  usual  and  normal  
cost.”  The  law  was  made  in  response  to  a  civil  rights  protest  which  cost  $670,000  for  3,000  state  
and  local  police  and  national  guard  members  to  arrest  a  crowd  of  1,000  counter  demonstrators.  In  
this  case,  a  group  called  the  Nationalist  Movement  wanted  to  hold  a  demonstration  in  opposition  
to  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.  Day.  They  were  assessed  a  fee  of  $100  and  the  group  sued  the  county  
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instead  of  holding  their  rally.  That  amount  did  not  include  a  calculation  for  the  estimated  cost  of  
law  enforcement.   
  
Ruling:  County  fees  to  demonstrators  based  on  the  estimated  cost  of  additional  law  enforcement  
from  expected  backlash  violate  the  First  Amendment  Right  to  free  speech  and  assembly.  The  
ordinance  is  invalid  because  it  leaves  “impermissibly  standardless  discretion  in  the  hands  of  the  
county  administrator.”  There  is  no  way  the  decision  can  be  reviewed  on  objective  factors  and  it  
allows  for  a  public  official  to  arbitrarily  apply  fees  to  encourage  some  views  and  discourage  
others.  It  also  allows  for  the  heckler's  veto—the  speaker’s  speech  is  financially  burdened  by  the  
administrator’s  estimation  of  the  amount  of  hostility  that  is  likely  to  be  created  by  the  content  
that  offends.  The  $1,000  cap  does  not  save  the  ordinance  because  “a  tax  based  on  the  content  of  
the  speech  does  not  become  more  constitutional  because  it  is  a  small  tax.”  Time,  place,  and  
manner  restrictions  must  be  narrowly  tailored  to  serve  a  reasonable  government  interest  and  
cannot  be  arbitrarily  decided  by  a  single  government  official.  
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
30. Madsen  v.  Women’s  Health  Center  (1994)  
  
FACTS:  A  Florida  state  injunction  limited  the  activities  of  antiabortion  protestors  on  the  public  
streets  outside  an  abortion  clinic.  The  protestors  had  violated  a  previous  narrower  injunction  
against  blocking  clinic  access.  The  current  injunction  had  several  requirements:  (1)  a  36-foot 
buffer  zone  around  the  building,  (2)  noise  and  image  restrictions  prohibiting  amplified  noise  that  
could  be  heard  inside  the  clinic  between  7:30  a.m.  and  noon  Mondays  through  Saturdays,  and  
images  observable  from  inside  the  clinic,  (3)  a  requirement  that  protestors  refrain  from  
approaching  clinic  patients  without  invitation  within  300  feet  of  the  clinic,  and  (4)  a  prohibition  
of  picketing,  demonstrating,  or  using  sound  amplification  equipment  within  300  feet  of  the  clinic  
staff  residences.   
  
Ruling:  The  Florida  injunction  was  partially  in  violation  of  the  protestors’  First  Amendment  
rights  to  assembly  and  speech.  The  injunction  was  content-neutral.  The  petitioners  had  violated  a  
previous  injunction  and  the  new  injunction  applies  specifically  to  them.  Liberties  may  be  
restricted  when  the  law  is  broken.  The  injunction  serves  a  number  of  significant  government  
interests:  protecting  women’s  freedom  to  seek  lawful  medical  or  counseling  services  in  
connection  with  her  pregnancy,  ensuring  public  safety  and  order,  the  free  flow  of  traffic  on  
public  streets  and  sidewalks,  protecting  property  rights,  and  protecting  the  physical  and  
psychological  well-being  of  an  audience  captive  by  medical  circumstance.  The  36-foot  buffer  
zone  around  the  entrances  prohibiting  “congregating,  picketing,  patrolling  or  demonstrating”  is  
permissible,  but  it  cannot  be  applied  to  the  sides  and  back  of  the  building  as  that  speech  does  not  
interfere  with  clinic  access.  Noise  restriction  is  okay,  image  restriction  is  not.  Noise  control  is  
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important  for  surgery  and  recovery,  but  the  display  of  unwanted  images  outside  the  clinic  can  be  
managed  by  closing  the  blinds.  The  provision  restricting  approaching  patients  within  300  feet  is  
difficult  to  justify  because  it  prohibits  all  uninvited  approaches  of  patients,  regardless  of  how  
peaceful  the  content  may  be.  It  burdens  more  speech  than  necessary  to  prevent  intimidation  and  
to  ensure  access  to  the  clinic.  The  300-foot  buffer  zone  prohibiting  picketing  or  demonstrating  of  
the  clinic  staff  residences  is  overbroad  and  there  is  not  sufficient  justification  for  such  a  broad  
ban  on  picketing.  It  would  be  better  handled  as  it  was  in  Frisby  with  a  prohibition  of  focused  
picketing.  Special  stringency  is  required  in  the  context  of  an  injunction  because  an  injunction  is  
at  higher  risk  of  being  overly  restrictive  and  discriminatory  than  a  general  ordinance.  Time,  
place,  and  manner  restrictions  must  be  content  neutral  and  narrowly  tailored  to  serve  a  
significant  government  interest.   
  
INDEX:  1-unstated  (0%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-yes  (0%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  (+5%),  5-no,  
someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  (+5%),  6-no  (+10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-n/a  
(0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
31. Rosenberger  v.  Rector  &  Visitors  of  University  of  Virginia  (1995)  
  
FACTS:  The  University  of  Virginia  had  a  policy  prohibiting  the  use  of  activities  fees  for  any  
“religious  activity,”  activity  that  “primarily  promotes  or  manifests  a  particular  belief  in  or  about  a  
deity  or  an  ultimate  reality.”  Rosenberger,  a  student  at  the  University,  requested  $5,800  for  the  
publishing  cost  of  “Wide  Awake:  A  Christina  Perspective  at  the  University  of  Virginia.”  The  
school,  who’s  fees  were  generally  for  the  use  of  paying  costs  of  extracurricular  activities,  
including  the  costs  of  printing  various  student  edited  publications,  refused  to  pay.   
  
Ruling:  The  University  of  Virginia  violated  Rosenberger’s  First  Amendment  rights  by  refusing  
funding  for  a  student  publication  they  would  have  otherwise  funded  had  it  not  been  for  the  
pro-religious  content  of  the  proposed  publication.  The  Court  found  this  to  be  a  case  of  viewpoint  
discrimination,  not  content  discrimination.  The  perspective  of  pro-religion  was  prohibited,  
“result[ing]  in  the  refusal  to  make  third-party  payments,  for  the  subjects  discussed  were  
otherwise  within  the  approved  category  of  publications.”  There  is  a  clear  distinction  between  the  
University’s  own  messages  and  the  messages  of  students’  private  speech.  Because  they  had  
offered  to  pay  for  the  publication  of  students’  messages  as  third-party  contractors  of  a  private  
message,  they  may  not  silence  the  expression  of  selected  viewpoints.  The  restriction  of  religious  
activity  must  be  justified  by  a  compelling  state  interest.   
  






32. Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston  (1995)  
  
FACTS:  The  GLIB  group  wanted  to  join  Hurley’s  St.  Patrick’s  Day  Parade.  The  parade  was  set  
to  take  place  in  public  streets  but  was  put  on  by  private  organizers.  The  organizers  were  okay  
with  the  GLIB  group  members  joining  the  parade,  but  not  with  them  being  their  own  unit  with  an 
identifying  banner.  A  Massachusetts  state  antidiscrimination  law  forbids  discrimination  on  the  
basis  of  sexual  orientation  in  the  admission  or  treatment  of  any  person  in  a  place  of  public  
accommodation.   
  
Ruling:  The  Massachusetts  court  order  mandating  the  inclusion  of  the  GLIB  group  in  the  St.  
Patrick’s  Day  parade  according  to  the  Massachusetts  anti-discrimination  law  was  in  violation  of  
the  organizers  1st  Amendment  rights  of  free  speech  and  association.  The  parade  was  set  by  a  
private  group  who  has  a  rightful  intent  to  portray  whatever  message  they  seek  to  communicate  
by  the  parade.  The  GLIB  members  were  not  excluded  from  participating  in  the  parade  as  
individuals,  nor  was  their  message  blocked  as  they  could  have  put  on  their  own  parade.  The  
government  may  not  compel  a  private  entity  to  include  particular  messages  in  a  privately  
organized  parade  based  on  state  anti-discrimination  laws.  
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
33. Boy  Scouts  of  America  v.  Dale  (2000)  
  
FACTS:  James  Dale,  an  otherwise  qualified  scoutmaster,  was  excluded  from  the  Boy  Scouts  of  
America  on  the  ground  that  he  had  publicly  disclosed  his  homosexuality.  The  Boy  Scouts  
claimed  that  it  was  their  First  Amendment  expressive  association  right  to  exclude  individuals  but  
the  New  Jersey  public  accommodations  law  bars  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  sexual  
orientation.  
  
Ruling:  The  forced  inclusion  of  an  individual  in  a  group  infringes  upon  the  right  to  expressive  
association  if  their  inclusion  impacts  the  group’s  ability  to  advocate  their  viewpoint.  Through  
their  mission  statement,  the  group  engages  in  expressive  association;  seeking  to  transmit  a  
specific  system  of  values  equates  to  engaging  in  expressive  activity.  The  Boy  Scouts  believe  that  
homosexuality  is  at  odds  with  their  values  embodied  in  the  Scout  Oath  of  “morally  straight”  and  
“clean.”  If  the  Boy  Scouts  do  “not  want  to  promote  homosexual  conduct  as  a  legitimate  form  of  
behavior,”  it  is  their  right  to  express  that  viewpoint.  Having  an  openly  gay  scoutmaster  
significantly  burdens  their  ability  to  express  that  viewpoint.  Expressive  Association  allows  
rejection  of  opinions  inconsistent  with  stated  views  of  the  organization.  
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes  greatly  (-15%) 16 .  Score:  85%  
16  The  ruling  permits  the  suppression  of  LGBTQ  individuals’  access  to  free  expression  in  the  public  sphere.  
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34. VA  v.  Black  (2003)  
  
FACTS:  Three  individuals  were  separately  prosecuted  under  a  Virginia  statute  which  stated:  “It  
shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  or  persons,  with  the  intent  of  intimidating  any  person  or  group  
of  persons,  to  burn,  or  cause  to  be  burned,  a  cross  on  the  property  of  another,  a  highway  or  other  
public  place.  Any  person  who  shall  violate  any  provision  of  this  section  shall  be  guilty  of  a  Class  
6  felony,”  and  “Any  such  burning  of  a  cross  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  an  intent  to  
intimidate  a  person  or  group  of  persons.”   
  
Ruling:  Cross  burning  has  long  been  a  symbol  of  threat  of  violence  or  death  from  the  KKK.  Past  
rulings  (Watts)  have  ruled  that  true  threats  are  not  protected  speech.  Discrimination  prohibiting  
all  forms  of  a  particular  content  are  not  permissible—rather  a  particular  type  of  threat  can  be  
restricted.  The  Virginia  statute  restricts  cross  burning  with  “the  intent  to  intimidate,”  not  mere  
cross  burning.  Therefore,  the  statue  itself  is  not  unconstitutional.  The  prima  facie  provision  
which  states  that  cross  burning  alone  is  evidence  of  intimidation  is  overbroad  and  violates  the  1st  
Amendment  because  it  “would  create  unacceptable  risk  to  the  suppression  of  ideas.”  Speech  
cannot  be  prohibited  merely  because  it  offends.   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-present  and  significant  (-2%),  3-yes  (0%) 17 ,  4-less  effective  alternatives  
(-5%),  5-someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  severely  infringed  upon  (+10%),  6-yes  (-10%),  
7-yes  (-10%) 18 ,  8-yes  (-10%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well-defined,  and  
necessary  to  ensure  a  significant  public  interest  (-5%).  Score:  58%  
  
35. San  Diego  v.  Roe  (2004)  
  
FACTS:  A  San  Diego  police  officer  made  videos  of  himself  stripping  off  a  police  uniform  and  
masturbating,  including  while  issuing  a  traffic  ticket,  and  sold  them  online  on  eBay,  listing  
himself  in  his  user  profile  as  employed  in  the  field  of  law  enforcement.  He  was  terminated  from  
the  police  force  and  alleged  that  the  termination  violated  his  right  to  free  speech.   
  
Ruling:  Roe’s  termination  from  the  police  force  after  his  inappropriate  activities  do  not  qualify  as  
a  violation  to  his  1st  Amendment  rights.  The  police  department  demonstrated  legitimate  and  
substantial  interests  of  its  own  that  were  compromised  by  his  speech.  His  activities  were  related  
and  linked  to  his  employment  and  injurious  to  his  employer.  Pickering  did  not  hold  that  any  and  
all  statements  by  public  employees  are  entitled  to  balancing.  Such  speech  entitled  to  balancing  
17  The  Court  determined  cross  burning  to  be  a  “true  threat”  given  the  historical  pattern  of  white  supremacists  
following  such  an  act  with  violence  or  murder.  A  threat  to  one’s  life,  family,  and/or  community  is  likely  to  incur  
psychological  distress  and  could  lead  to  post-traumatic  stress  disorder  which  has  been  shown  to  have  detrimental  
effects  on  brain  functioning.  Nutt,  D.  J.,  &  Malizia,  A.  L.  (2004).  Structural  and  functional  brain  changes  in  
posttraumatic  stress  disorder.  The  Journal  of  clinical  psychiatry,  65  Suppl  1,  11–17.  
18  Historically,  racism  in  the  United  States  is  strongly  politicized  (Levitsky  &  Ziblatt,  2018).  
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must  touch  on  a  matter  of  public  concern --something  that  is  a  subject  of  legitimate  news  interest,  
in  general  interest  of  value  and  concern  to  the  public  at  the  time  of  publication.  A  balance  must  
be  struck  between  the  interests  of  the  citizen  and  the  state.   
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-present  and  significant  (-2%),  3-maybe  (-5%) 19 ,  4-less  effective  or  
compromised  alternatives  (-5%),  5-no,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  
(+5%) 20 ,  6-maybe  or  to  a  slight  degree  (0%),  7-no  (0%),  8-potentially  (-5%),  9-somewhat,  but  
there  is  other  similar  content  available  (-5%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  73%  
  
36. Morse  v.  Frederick  (2007)  
  
FACTS:  Frederick  a  high  school  student  unfurled  a  banner  at  a  school  sanctioned  event  
containing  the  message  “BONG  HiTS  4  JESUS.”  The  school-approved  class  trip  took  place  
when  the  Olympic  torch  passed  through  Juneau,  Alaska  and  the  local  high  school  principal  
allowed  students  to  go  outside  the  school  to  watch  under  teacher  supervision.  When  the  student  
unfurled  the  banner,  the  principle  interpreted  it  as  drug-related  speech,  confiscated  it,  and  
punished  Frederick.  The  Juneau  school  board  policy  specifically  prohibited  “any  assembly  or  
public  expression  that  advocates  the  use  of  substances  that  are  illegal  to  minors.”   
  
Ruling:  Reprimanding  a  high  school  student  for  a  banner  interpreted  to  contain  a  drug-related  
message  at  a  school-sanctioned  event  did  not  violate  his  First  Amendment  right  to  free  speech.  
The  student  cannot  claim  it  was  not  clear  that  he  was  “at  school”  given  that  he  was  in  the  midst  
of  his  fellow  students,  during  school  hours,  at  a  school-sanctioned  event,  under  teacher  
supervision.  This  case  does  not  involve  a  political  debate  over  the  criminalization  of  drug  use  or  
possession.  The  school  district  has  a  reasonable  and  compelling  interest  in  deterring  drug  use  in  
schoolchildren.  The  danger  is  far  more  serious  and  palpable  than  the  undifferentiated  fear  or  
apprehension  of  disturbance  or  mere  desire  to  avoid  discomfort  and  unpleasantness  that  
accompany  an  unpopular  viewpoint  (Tinker).  “The  concern  here  is  not  that  Frederick’s  speech  
was  offensive,  but  that  it  was  reasonably  viewed  as  promoting  illegal  drug  use.”  Schools  may  
claim  a  reasonable  and  compelling  interest  in  restricting  speech  promoting  illegal  drug  use.   
  
19  It  is  possible  that  civilians  could  feel  unsafe  around  a  police  officer  who  has  engaged  in  unprofessional  sexual  
misconduct.  
20  The  tax-paying  body  has  a  right  to  a  professional  and  trustworthy  law  enforcement  body  using  government  
resources  in  the  best  interest  of  the  communities  they  serve  if  that  is  the  system  the  locally  and  democratically  
elected  legislature  has  installed.  
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INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-no  (-10%) 21 ,  4-bountiful  alternatives  (+5%),  5-yes  
(-15%),  6-yes  (-10%) 22 ,  7-no  (0%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-no  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  50%  
  
37. FCC  v.  Fox  Television  (2009)  
  
FACTS:  The  FCC  had  previously  allowed  for  speech  which  contained  “fleeting  expletives.”  
During  the  Golden  Globe  award  Bono  had  previously  used  the  word  “fuck”  as  an  intensifier  to  
describe  how  “brilliant”  he  found  the  award.  At  another  award  ceremony  thereafter,  Cher  and  
Nicole  Richie  used  F-  and  S-  words  in  the  same  fleeting  manner,  to  which  the  FCC  issued  a  
sanction  of  liability  to  Fox  Television  Stations  finding  those  utterances  “indecent.”  The  FCC  
argued  that  there  was  no  distinction  between  explicates  and  descriptions  of  sexual  or  excretory  
functions  therefore  to  allow  for  “automatic  exemption  for  ‘isolated  or  fleeting’  expletives  
unfairly  forces  viewers  (including  children)”  to  take  “the  first  blow.”  Fox  argued  that  under  the  
Administrative  Procedure  Act,  the  FCC’s  policy  change  without  any  due  warning  was  “arbitrary  
and  capricious.”  
  
Ruling:  The  FCC’s  order  charging  liability  to  Fox  News  for  spoken  fleeting  expletives  is  not  
unlawfully  “arbitrary  and  capricious”  under  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act.  The  Court  
declined  to  make  a  statement  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  FCC’s  order  under  the  First  
Amendment  but  did  note  “any  chilled  references  to  excretory  and  sexual  material  ‘surely  lie  at  
the  periphery  of  First  Amendment  concern’”  (Pacifica).   
  
INDEX:  1-to  some  (-5%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-less  effective  or  
compromised  alternatives  (-5%),  5-someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  (+5%),  
6-yes  (-10%),  7-no  (0%),  8-n/a  (0%),  9-yes  (-10%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  60%  
  
38. Christian  Legal  Society  v.  Martinez  (2010)  
  
FACTS:  The  Christian  Legal  Society  wanted  to  become  an  official  registered  student  
organization.  But  the  group  did  not  allow  any  student  to  participate;  you  had  to  sign  a  “Statement  
of  Faith”  and  renounce  “unrepentant  homosexual  conduct.”  Hastings  College  of  Law  refused  
their  request  because  they  require  that  RSOs  allow  any  student  to  participate,  become  a  member,  
or  seek  leadership  positions  in  the  organization  regardless  of  their  status  or  beliefs.   
21  The  case’s  dissent  by  Justice  Stevens  joined  by  Justices  Souter  and  Ginsburg  argues  the  banner  was  nonsensical  
and  did  not  advocate  drug  use.  Even  so,  “no  one  seriously  maintains  that  drug  advocacy  (much  less  Frederick’s  
ridiculous  sign)  comes  with  the  vanishingly  small  category  of  speech  that  can  be  prohibited  because  of  its  feared  
consequences.  It  is  implausible  that  the  message  on  the  banner  would  actually  persuade  the  average  or  even  the  
dumbest  student  to  change  their  drug  usage  behavior.   
22  A  concurrence  written  by  Justice  Thomas  elaborates  to  say  schools  act  “in  loco  parentis.”  The  Constitution  does  
not  afford  students  a  right  to  free  speech  in  public  schools.  In  the  past,  the  courts  have  deferred  to  the  schools’  
authority  to  make  and  enforce  rules  for  their  students.  Tinker  ought  to  be  dispensed.  This  concurrence  implies  that  





Ruling:  The  Hastings  college  “all-comers  policy”  requirement  for  campus  groups  to  be  granted  
Registered  Student  Organization  status  did  not  violate  Christian  Legal  Society’s  1st  Amendment  
rights  to  freedom  of  speech  and  association.  Considering  the  educational  context,  Hastings  
“all-comers”  policy  is  reasonable  and  viewpoint  neutral.  The  policy  helps  police  the  
Nondiscrimination  Policy  without  inquiring  into  an  RSO’s  motivation  for  membership  
restriction.  It  has  no  distinction  between  groups  based  on  their  message  or  perspective.  
Traditional  public  forums  and  created  public  forums  opened  for  that  purpose  are  held  to  strict  
scrutiny  of  restrictions.  This  case  involves  a  limited  public  forum  (a  forum  limited  to  use  by  
certain  groups  or  dedicated  solely  to  the  discussion  of  certain  subjects),  which  may  impose  
restrictions  which  are  reasonable  and  viewpoint  neutral.  
  
INDEX:  1-no  (0%),  2-present  and  significant  (-2%),  3-yes  (0%),  4-less  effective  or  compromised  
alternatives  (-5%),  5-no,  someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  infringed  upon  (+5%),  6-yes  
(-10%),  7-indirectly  (-5%),  8-yes  (-10%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  73%  
  
39. Doe  v.  Reed  (2010)  
  
FACTS:  The  Washington’s  Public  Records  Act  requires  that  the  names  and  addresses  of  those  
who  sign  referendum  ballot  petitions  be  publicly  disclosed.  The  challenge  was  brought  by  
supporters  of  a  petition  challenging  a  state  law  extending  certain  benefits  to  same-sex  couples.   
  
Ruling:  Washington’s  Public  Record  Act  does  not  violate  the  First  Amendment  freedom  of  
speech;  signers  of  referendum  ballot  petitions  do  not  have  a  right  to  anonymity  if  their  safety  is  
potentially  threatened  by  signing  a  particular  petition.  Under  exacting  scrutiny,  a  substantial  
relation  between  the  disclosure  requirement  and  a  sufficiently  important  government  interest  is  
required.  There  is  a  sufficient  government  interest  in  “preserving  the  integrity  of  the  electoral  
processes  by  combating  fraud,  detecting  invalid  signatures,  and  fostering  government  
transparency  and  accountability.”  Typical  referendum  interests  do  not  vary  in  danger  from  the  
referendum  matter  in  this  case.   
  
INDEX:1-to  some  (-5%),  2-possible  (-10%),  3-maybe  (-5%),  4-less  accessible  alternatives  
(-5%),  5-someone  else’s  liberties  or  rights  were  at  risk  (+3%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-no  
(0%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  58%  
  
40. Snyder  v.  Phelps  (2011)  
  
FACTS:  The  Westboro  Baptist  Church  protested  a  military  funeral  from  1,000  feet  away  on  
public  land.  The  signs  used  to  protest  contained  themes  of  God,  the  cursed  nature  of  the  United  
States,  supporting  the  country’s  military  enemies,  and  homophobia.  A  Maryland  jury  charged  
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them  liable  for  “$2.9  million  in  compensatory  damages  and  $8  million  in  punitive  damages  for  
the  torts  of  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress,  intrusion  upon  seclusion  and  civil  
conspiracy.”   
  
Ruling:  The  1 st   Amendment  protects  Westboro  Baptist  Church  funeral  picketers  from  being  
charged  for  intentionally  inflicting  emotional  distress  upon  the  deceased’s  family.  The  distinction  
between  speech  relating  to  public  or  private  matters  determines  the  state’s  ability  to  restrict  the  
speech.  “…restricting  speech  on  purely  private  matters  does  not  implicate  the  same  
constitutional  concerns  as  limiting  speech  on  matters  of  public  interest.”  Because  the  nature  of  
their  speech  made  an  argument  that  pertained  to  public  interest  (the  United  States’  policies  on  
homosexuality),  it  was  constitutionally  protected.  “Given  that  Westboro’s  speech  was  at  a  public  
place  on  a  matter  of  public  concern,  that  speech  is  entitled  to  “special  protection”  under  the  First  
Amendment.  Speech  cannot  be  restricted  simply  because  it  offends.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a,  10-yes  (-10%).  Score:  90%  
  
41. US  v.  Alvarez  (2012)  
  
FACTS:  Alvarez,  in  a  California  public  hearing,  falsely  claimed  that  he  was  a  retired  marine  who  
had  been  wounded  in  combat  and  had  been  awarded  the  Congressional  Medal  of  Honor.  He  was  
convicted  under  the  Stolen  Valor  Act  which  made  it  a  crime  to  falsely  claim  receipt  of  military  
decorations  or  medals  and  provided  an  enhanced  penalty  if  the  Congressional  Medal  of  Honor  
was  involved.   
  
Ruling:  The  Stolen  Valor  Act  criminalizing  false  claim  to  military  decoration  is  in  violation  of  
the  1st  Amendment.  The  Court’s  libel  precedents  did  not  claim  that  false  statements  had  no  
constitutional  protection—rather  this  case  requires  “exacting  scrutiny”  be  used  to  evaluate  the  
content-based  restriction.  The  holding  references  George  Orwell’s  1984,  saying  the  Constitution  
stands  against  the  notion  that  the  United  States  needs  Oceania’s  Ministry  of  Truth.  For  
government  to  try  to  punish  everyone  who  has  made  false  statement  would  “chill  the  First  
Amendment”  and  create  an  impermissible  restraint  on  “free  speech,  thought,  and  discourse”  
which  would  unground  the  foundation  of  American  freedom.  “The  remedy  for  speech  that  is  
false  is  speech  that  is  true.”   
  








42. McCullen  v.  Coakley  (2014)  
  
FACTS:  A  Massachusetts  statute  created  a  35-foot  buffer  zone  around  abortion-providing  
facilities  in  which  only  people  using  the  clinic,  working  at  the  clinic,  and  emergency  services  
were  allowed  to  enter  during  business  hours.   
  
Ruling:  The  Massachusetts  statue  was  an  unreasonable  time,  place,  and  manner  restriction  in  
violation  of  the  First  Amendment  right  to  free  speech.  The  statute  does  not  draw  content-based  
distinctions  on  its  face.  A  facially  neutral  law  does  not  become  content  based  simply  because  it  
may  disproportionately  affect  speech  on  certain  topics.  It  is  also  viewpoint  neutral.  “there  is  
nothing  inherently  suspect  about  providing  some  kind  of  exemption  to  allow  individuals  who  
work  at  the  clinics  to  enter  or  remain  within  the  buffer  zones.”  Strict  scrutiny  is  unnecessary;  
intermediate  scrutiny  found  that  the  law  was  not  narrowly  tailored  because  it  burdened  
“substantially  more  speech  than  necessary  to  further  the  government’s  legitimate  interest.”  E.g.  
restricting  one-on-one  communication;  petitioners  are  not  protestors.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well-defined,  and  necessary  to  ensure  a  
significant  public  interest  (-5%).  Score:  95%  
  
43. Elonis  v.  US  (2015)  
  
FACTS:  Elonis  threatened  to  kill  his  ex-wife  via  a  rap-lyric  form  on  Facebook,  “Did  you  know  
that  it’s  illegal  for  me  to  say  I  want  to  kill  my  wife?  ...  It’s  one  of  the  only  sentences  that  I’m  not  
allowed  to  say…”  He  was  convicted  under  18  USC  Section  875  c  which  criminalizes  “any  
communication  containing  any  threat…to  injure  the  person  of  another.”  The  jury  was  instructed  
that  an  objective  intent  to  threaten  was  necessary  to  qualify  a  “True  Threat,”  but  the  defense  
argued  that  a  subjective  intent  to  threaten  was  necessary.   
  
Ruling:  A  conviction  under  181  USC  Section  875c  requires  proof  of  a  subjective  intent  to  
threaten.  The  conviction  was  overturned  due  to  the  statute’s  implicit  requirement  that  intent  to  
threaten  or  knowledge  that  the  communication  would  be  understood  as  a  threat  be  shown,  which  
was  not  charged  to  the  jury.  The  prosecution  needed  to  show  that  the  defense  intended  the  
communication  as  threat  or  understood  that  the  communication  would  be  seen  as  a  threat—that  
there  was  a  subjective  intent  to  threaten.  The  reasonable  person  test  does  not  separate  actors  
threatening  with  purposeful  intent  from  innocent,  accidental  conduct.  In  order  to  be  convicted,  
the  law  requires  proof  of  a  subjective  intent  to  threaten;  a  speaker  may  not  be  convicted  out  of 
ignorance  or  by  the  reasonable  listener  test.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a,  10-yes,  but  they  are  narrow,  well-defined,  and  necessary  to  ensure  a  significant  
public  interest  (-5%).  Score:  95%  
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44. Walker  v.  Texas  Division,  Sons  of  Confederate  Veterans  (TDSCV)  (2015)  
  
FACTS:  Texas  had  a  specialty  license  plate  program  in  which  it  allowed  organizations  or  
individuals  the  chance  to  design  “specialty  plates”  by  proposing  a  plate  design  comprising  a  
slogan,  a  graphic,  or  both.  The  TDSCV  proposed  a  plate  design  featuring  a  Confederate  battle  
flag.  The  Texas  Department  of  Motor  Vehicles  (DMV)  rejected  the  proposal  because  they  
concluded  many  Texans  would  find  the  flag  symbol  offensive.  
  
Ruling:  Texas  did  not  create  a  limited  public  forum  required  to  maintain  viewpoint  neutrality  
with  its  specialty  license  plate  program.  The  Texas  DMV  decision  to  reject  the  specialty  license  
plate  proposal  from  the  TDSCV  did  not  violate  the  1st  Amendment  right  to  Free  Expression.  
Specialty  license  plates  are  government  speech,  not  a  forum  of  any  type  required  to  First  
Amendment  strictures.  License  plates  are  government  speech,  not  private  speech.  The  state  is  
speaking  on  its  own  behalf,  so  the  forum  analysis  would  not  apply.  Specialty  license  plates  are  a  
limited  forum;  Texas  is  not  simply  managing  government  property  but  engaging  in  expressive  
conduct.  They  have  a  right  to  determine  what  messages  the  state  endorses.  If  an  individual  
wanted  to  picture  the  confederate  battle  flag  in  that  location,  they  could  have  easily  done  so  with 
a  large  bumper  sticker.  Proposing  a  license  plate  with  the  message  has  the  specific  intent  to  
convey  that  the  State  has  endorsed  that  message.  Vehicle  registration  is  a  privilege,  not  a  
constitutional  right.  
  
INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-bountiful  alternatives  (+5%),  
5-yes  (-15%),  6-no  (+10%),  7-yes  (-10%),  8-yes  (-10%),  9-n/a  (0%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  55%  
  
45. National  Institute  of  Family  and  Life  Advocates  v.  Becerra  (2018)  
  
FACTS:  The  California  Reproductive  Freedom,  Accountability,  Comprehensive  Care,  and  
Transparency  Act  (FACT  Act)  required  licensed  clinics  that  primarily  serve  pregnant  women  to  
notify  patients  that  California  provides  free  or  low-cost  services,  including  abortions,  and  to  give  
them  a  phone  number  to  call.  The  law  also  required  unlicensed  clinics  to  notify  patients  that  
California  had  not  licensed  the  clinics  to  provide  medical  services.  Both  parts  of  the  law—the  
licensed  and  unlicensed  notices—were  challenged  by  “crisis  pregnancy  centers”  that  aimed  to  
discourage  pregnant  women  from  obtaining  abortions.   
  
Ruling:The  California  Reproductive  FACT  Act  violates  the  First  Amendment  freedom  of  speech  
rights  of  the  crisis  pregnancy  centers  by  compelling  speech  unwillingly.  The  requirement  is  
content-based  regulation  of  speech.  Professional  speech  can  only  be  regulated  when  factual,  
noncontroversial  speech  is  required  or  when  professional  conduct  is  regulated,  and  it  incidentally  
impacts  speech.  Professional  speech  has  been  historically  protected  outside  of  those  two  contexts  
in  order  to  protect  against  the  suppression  of  unpopular  ideas  rather  than  the  pursuance  of  
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legitimate  regulatory  interests.  The  Act  was  not  sufficiently  tailored  to  the  declared  government  
interest  of,  “providing  low-income  women  information  about  state-sponsored  health  services.”   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-no  (0%).  Score:  100%  
  
46. Stanley  v.  GA  (1969)  
  
FACTS:  Stanley  was  convicted  under  a  Georgia  statute  for  knowing  “possession  of  obscene  
material.”  Obscene  films  were  found  during  a  home  search  for  bookmaking  evidence.  Georgia  
defended  its  law  based  on  Roth  and  with  the  argument  that,  “If  the  State  can  protect  the  body  of  
the  citizen,  may  it  not  also  protect  his  mind?”   
  
Ruling:  The  Georgia  statute  banning  the  possession  of  obscene  material  violated  the  1st  
Amendment.  The  1st  Amendment  protects  the  right  to  receive  information  and  ideas  regardless  
of  social  worth  and  against  a  prosecution  for  mere  possession  in  the  privacy  of  one’s  own  home.  
The  Roth  test  was  intended  for  cases  involving  the  public  distribution  of  obscene  material  that  
has  different  risks  which  are  not  presented  in  this  case.  Laws  preventing  the  distribution  of  
obscene  material  are  necessary  to  prevent  child  pornography  and  the  exposure  of  children  and  
unconsenting  adults  to  obscene  materials.  Justifying  the  law  by  the  argument  that  a  possession  
ban  is  necessary  to  curb  schemes  of  distribution  is  not  convincing,  nor  would  it  justify  
infringement  of  the  individual’s  right  to  read  or  observe  what  he  pleases. 
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes,  but  they  are  intended  to  serve  a  public  interest  (-5%).  Score:  95%  
  
47. Paris  Adult  Theater  v.  Slaton  (1973)  
  
FACTS:  Two  adult  theaters  were  challenged  for  having  vague  signs  outside  that  “did  not  indicate  
the  full  nature  of  what  was  shown.  In  particular,  nothing  indicated  that  the  films  depicted—as  
they  did—scenes  simulated  fellatio,  cunnilingus,  and  group  sex  intercourse.”   
  
Ruling:  By  the  Miller  test,  the  Georgia  statute  did  not  violate  the  First  Amendment  freedom  of  
expression.  “States  have  a  legitimate  interest  in  regulating  commerce  in  obscene  material  and  in 
regulating  exhibition  of  obscene  material  in  places  of  public  accommodation,  including  so-called  
“adult”  theaters  from  which  minors  are  excluded.”  There  is  a  difference  between  having  the  right  
to  own  obscene  material  in  the  privacy  of  one’s  own  home  and  having  a  right  to  have  access  to  
obscene  material.  To  grant  the  right  of  such  access  affects  the  world  around  everyone  and  
impinges  on  the  privacies  of  others.  There  is  no  “privacy”  right  in  a  place  of  public  




INDEX:  1-yes  (-10%),  2-present  and  petty  (-5%),  3-no  (-10%),  4-no  obvious  alternatives  (-10%),  
5-yes  (-15%),  6-yes  (-10%),  7-no  (0%),  8-yes  (-10%),  9-yes  (-10%),  10-n/a  (0%).  Score:  20%  
  
48. Jenkins  v.  GA  (1974)  
  
FACTS:  The  state  convicted  Jenkins  for  showing  the  film  “Carnal  Knowledge.”  While  the  
subject  matter  of  the  picture  in  a  broader  sense  was  sex,  the  sexual  scenes  within  the  film  did  not  
focus  on  the  actors’  bodies  or  display  genitalia.  There  was  non-obscene  nudity  in  the  film  and  the  
film  was  considered  to  be  mainstream,  given  that  it  starred  prominent  actors  and  had  been  
nominated  for  Academy  Awards.   
  
Ruling:  Jenkins’  obscenity  conviction  for  showing  the  film  “Carnal  Knowledge”  violated  the  
First  Amendment  freedom  of  speech.  While  the  Miller  test  does  allow  the  regulation  of  material  
appealing  to  prurient  interest  or  having  elements  of  patent  offensiveness,  the  jury  is  not  then  
given  unbridled  discretion  to  determine  what  is  ‘patently  offensive.’  The  film  in  question  “could  
not  be  found  to  depict  sexual  conduct  in  a  patently  offensive  way.”  While  the  broader  theme  to  
the  film  was  sex,  the  depictions  of  sexual  conduct  were  vaguely  portrayed  and  non-obscene.  The  
nudity  in  the  film  could  not  be  determined  to  be  materially,  legally,  obscene  by  the  Miller  
standards.  Juries  don't  have  unbridled  discretion  to  determine  what  is  patently  offensive.   
  
INDEX:  1-9  n/a  (0%),  10-yes  (-10%).  Score:  90%  
  
49. Packingham  v.  NC  (2017)  
  
FACTS:  Packingham  was  convicted  under  a  state  law  which  made  it  a  felony  for  a  registered  sex  
offender  “to  access  a  commercial  social  networking  web  site  where  the  sex  offender  knows  that  
the  site  permits  minor  children  to  become  members  or  to  create  or  maintain  personal  Web  
pages.”   
  
Ruling:  The  North  Carolina  law  was  in  violation  of  the  1st  Amendment  freedom  of  speech.  
Social  media  is  a  public  forum  for  democratic  discussion.  By  the  1st  Amendment,  all  people  
should  “have  access  to  places  where  they  can  speak  and  listen,  and  then,  after  reflection,  speak  
and  listen  once  more.”  Social  media  allows  users  to  engage  in  a  wide  variety  of  activities  
protected  by  the  First  Amendment.  Although  we  make  this  ruling,  we  recognize  that  the  internet  
is  a  quickly  evolving  platform  and  what  we  “say  today  might  be  obsolete  tomorrow.”  The  statute  
is  overbroad  and  sweeps  broadly  into  protected  First  Amendment  speech.  Convicted  criminals  
who  have  served  their  sentences,  “might  receive  legitimate  benefits”  from  the  “world  of  ideas”  
the  internet  offers,  “in  particular  if  they  seek  to  reform  and  to  pursue  lawful  and  rewarding  
lives.”  Content  neutral  regulation  of  speech  must  be  narrowly  tailored  to  serve  a  significant  
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50. US  v.  Stevens  (2010)  
  
FACTS:  Stevens  was  indicted  for  distributing  videos  of  dogfighting.  Dogfighting  is  unlawful  in  
all  50  States  and  in  D.C.  Stevens  challenged  18  U.S.C.  Section  48  which  criminalized  the  
commercial  creation,  sale,  or  possession  of  any  visual  or  auditory  depiction  “in  which  a  living  
animal  is  intentionally  maimed,  mutilated,  tortured,  wounded,  or  killed,”  if  that  conduct  in  the  
material  violated  a  federal  or  state  law  and  did  not  have  “serious  religious,  political,  scientific,  
educational,  journalistic,  historical,  or  artistic  value.”  The  law  was  intended  to  target  “crush  
videos,”  which  show  torture  and  killing  of  helpless  animals  for  sexual  fetish,  but  the  text  of  the  
law  was  not  limited  to  such  videos.   
  
Ruling:  The  federal  law  criminalizing  the  commercial  production,  sale,  and  possession  of  audio  
and  visual  materials  depicting  animal  cruelty  violated  the  1st  Amendment.  There  is  no  tradition  
of  excluding  depictions  of  animal  cruelty  from  the  First  Amendment.  The  Government  is  arguing  
that  a  simple  balancing  test  of  the  value  of  the  speech  against  the  societal  costs  justifies  the  law  
in  question.  Such  a  free-floating  test  is  startling  and  dangerous;  the  First  Amendment  itself  
reflects  a  judgement  of  balancing  the  restrictions  on  the  Government  and  the  interests  of  the  
American  people.  The  Government  did  not  defend  the  constitutionality  of  the  Law  beyond  its  
application  to  crush  videos,  but  the  statue  is  not  narrowly  targeted  to  such  conduct  and  bleeds  
into  other  speech  that  is  clearly  protected  such  as  hunting  magazines.  We  do  not  need  to  make  a  
determination  on  if  a  more  narrowly  tailored  statue  would  pass  constitutionality  given  that  
U.S.C.  Section  48  is  overbroad.  
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